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I. Introduction
There is a presumption in American politics that "liberal"
foreign policy tends to favor international cooperation,
international law, and international institutions in a way that
"conservative" foreign policy does not. If true, this would seem to
suggest that there is something especially "liberal" about
internationalist beliefs; after all, if there was reason for
conservatives to turn with open arms to the institutions like the
United Nations, wouldn't they do so? This partisan division seems
real enough. Consider first the work of Samuel Huntington, who,
in a recent book, identifies the emergence of a new "American
Dilemma."' The title is Who Are We? Challenges to America's
National Identity, and as it suggests, the dilemma concerns the
2future of nation-building, but not in Iraq or Afghanistan. For
Huntington, nation-building, or rather the lack thereof, has become
a dangerously desperate issue in American life, due in large part to
the rise of Hispanic immigration, multiculturalism, and the
tendency for many U.S. citizens to think in cosmopolitan terms
first, and as an American only second. The heart of the problem,
as Huntington sees it, is that these developments have steadily
eroded the Anglo-Protestant cultural core that has from the
beginning provided the gel of American identity.3 To the degree
that issues like an unchecked cosmopolitanism continue to go
unaddressed, the United States veers that much closer towards
Balkanization. 4
As seems fairly clear, many of these "threats" can easily be
framed as positive developments in a so-called liberal agenda,
which would likely advocate relaxed approached to immigration
1 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL
IDENTITY (2004). The phrase "American Dilemma" comes from GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1942).
2 This article recognizes the difference between nation-building and state-building.
For example, U.S. designs in Afghanistan and Iraq are state-building projects because
they are attempting to construct a particular type of government with international legal
personality. Attempts at forging national unity and solidarity through the thickening of
particular cultural, social, and historical bonds, on the other hand, are better identified as
nation-building.
3 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 142.
4 Id. at 143.
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questions, a heightened respect and embrace of multicultural
movements, and an encouragement of an internationalist
disposition. 5 Indeed, the rhetorical divide has been evident among
politicians as well as academics. John Bolton, as ever, provides a
telling example in his claim that the "Americanist" party has
arrived: "Recent clashes in and around the United States Senate
indicate that the Americanist party has awakened, and that the
harm and costs to the United States of belittling our popular
sovereignty and constitutionalism, and restricting both our
domestic and our international policy flexibility and power are
finally reaching attention." 6 Predictably, the liberal response is at
odds with Bolton's "Americanism," as expressed by advocates like
Erica-Irene Daes of the United Nations who point towards the
moral justifications in giving greater power to marginalized
populations, including those in the United States:
What most Indigenous Peoples seek, and the United Nations has
so far endorsed, is a hybrid of autonomy. Indigenous Peoples
must be able to participate effectively in the decisions affecting
their destiny at all levels, enjoying a large measure of control
over their internal affairs, and in equitable sharing of power in
national politics.
7
As a sociological matter, this relationship between
5 Perhaps the most high-profile illustration of this partisan divide along
international lines was the American presidential election of 2004, in which the
International Criminal Court was emblematically invoked as a gauge for American self-
determination, or lack thereof. On October 8, 2004 in the second presidential debate
with Senator John Kerry, President Bush said:
I love our values. And I recognize I've made some decisions that have caused
people to not understand the great values of our country .... I made a decision
not to join the International Criminal Court in The Hague, which is where our
troops could be brought to--brought in front of a judge, an unaccounted judge.
I don't think we ought to join that. That was unpopular. And so, what I'm
telling you is, is that sometimes in this world you make unpopular decisions
because you think they're right .... You don't want to join the International
Criminal Court just because it's popular in certain capitals in Europe.
Commission on Political Debate, The Second Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (Oct. 8,
2004), http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html.
6 John Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously? I CH. J. INT'L L.
205, 206 (2000).
7 Erica-Irene Daes, The Concepts of Self-determination and Autonomy of
Indigenous Peoples in the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 259, 269 (2001).
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internationalism and partisan politics might be descriptively
accurate. That is, when we look out at the world, it is typical to
find "liberals" defending the move to institutions and
"conservatives" all worked up over American sovereignty. A
thesis in this article is that for whatever this sociological finding is
worth (if it is even true), it says nothing on the matter of whether
the rhetoric actually makes sense. To be more specific, my
argument is that instead of understanding there to be a
monochromatic thing called "international law" which habitually
turns out to be a tool for so-called liberal interests, there are a
number of competing international legal orders, some susceptible
to liberal tastes--others, not so much. As a consequence, there is
a great deal of ambivalence in the international legal order, and it
is a mistake to believe, as people like Huntington and Bolton
appear to do, that international law stands for one thing, but not
another. To be sure, there are scores of principles that could never
be supported by international legal theory or doctrine, but with
respect to those that are, this Comment discusses some of the
conflicts that result.
To some extent, these conflicts are motivated by gaps and
ambivalences in liberal political theory. One such gap involves
the question of how membership within a particular political
community 8 in the international order should be determined.
There is a vast amount of foundational literature on the duties a
liberal society demands of its residents, as well as the duties owed
by liberal states to their citizens, but a gap in the theory that has
only received recent attention involves the question of when it can
be justified that a human being belongs to one liberal society but
not to another.9 That is, as a matter of political philosophy and not
law, how does one member know that another human being is a
non-member, and thus excluded from the sphere of equal
treatment? The boundary becomes discernable enough when
liberal vocabulary makes a transition from "individuals" to
"citizens," since "citizen" has a direct relationship with the "state."
Immanuel Kant's version of the liberal individual and "the
universal principle of right" suggest rights and duties persons owe
8 For discussion, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 37-40 (1983).
9 WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 261-68, 312-14
(2002).
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persons, regardless of their affiliation with a particular
government. Does it make sense to say that liberal political
philosophy leaves the question of membership open as a matter of
morality to a government's geographical choices? Another source
of ambivalence follows from the first. If liberalism is relatively
quiet on the question of membership, this has been tracked by a
normative disarray in international legal prescription on how
political communities should be organized. In contrast to the
membership problem (where there is an analytical gap between the
duties persons owe persons and citizens owing citizens), this
second source deals with the substantive content of international
law: what types of political organization should be admitted into
the international community, and which ones not?
In Part II of this essay, I explore the relationship between these
two sources of ambivalence, matching up three strands of liberal
nation-building theory with their counterparts in international law
in an effort to show how the varieties of international law are
plenty fortified for both liberal and conservative tastes. On this
account, international law can be viewed as a grocery store:
whatever you hope to have for dinner, even if you happen to be
Huntington or Bolton, you should be able to find what you are
looking for. 12
Subsequently, the first nation-building position to be discussed
is assmilationist, and as represented by Huntington, sets out a bold
declaration on the factors exacerbating the national identity crisis
and the road towards its amelioration. In Huntington's view,
reversing these trends will turn on the capacity for Americans to
remember and reinvigorate their Anglo-Protestant roots.1 3  As
opposed to the traditional image of a nation of immigrants mixing
and mingling particular cultural sensibilities, Huntington suggests
"tomato soup" as the new melting pot. This image emphasizes the
I0 KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 133 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991).
1I This point draws heavily on the work of Professor Gerry Simpson on liberalism
in international law. See Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 537
(2001).
12 Much of the foregoing discussion is influenced by critical approaches to
international legal study. See, e.g., David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking
against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335 (2000); DAVID KENNEDY,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987); MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS (2002); MART-ri KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
13 Id. at 30.
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cultural core of the white, Anglo-Protestant settlers and founders
of the United States, and to the extent that non-members have
immigrated, they have been subject to an over-powering
"Americanization," or assimilation into the basic cultural core.
1 4
Huntington writes: "[This model] assumes the centrality and
durability of the culture of the founding settlers. The culinary
metaphor is an Anglo-Protestant tomato soup to which
immigration adds celery, croutons, spices, parsley, and other
ingredients that enrich and diversify the taste, but are absorbed
into what remains fundamentally tomato soup.' 15 Tomato soup
nationalism explicitly rejects international norms as anathema in
what should be the return to America's settler-roots, but takes
ownership of contem P6orary liberal democracy as an outgrowth of
Anglo-Protestantism.
Standing in contrast is the second position of the mosaic and
American multiculturalism.17  In James Anaya's view, the
evolution of our national identity is being generated by
international developments in human rights law and its
incorporation of political pluralism. 1 This model moves beyond
individual citizenship and towards cultural identities as the
building blocks of the state.19 In this sense, the disaggregation of
national identity in the United States, largely a result of an
increasingly international orientation, is a normative good. ° This
version of the multicultural model therefore looks to international
law as a reflecting pool from which the United States will
hopefully take its prospective cues, shaping domestic norms in
14 Id. at 61.
15 Id. at 129.
16 Id. at 66-69.
17 See generally Kymlicka, supra note 9, at 327-70; CYNTHIA WILLET, THEORIZING
MULTICULTURALISM: A GUIDE TO THE CURRENT DEBATE (1998); MULTICULTURALISM
AND THE "POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992).
18 S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move
Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13 (2004).
19 Id. at 15.
20 Professor Anaya writes,
For indigenous peoples such cultural integrity means the continuation of a range
of cultural patterns, including patterns that establish rights to lands and natural
resources, and are embodied in indigenous customary law and institutions that
regulate indigenous societies. It is a truly multicultural state to which the model
of international human rights aspires .... Id.
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conformity with international ones. 21 Like assimilationists in the
Huntington mode, multiculturalists claim liberalism as the
generating force in their programmatic efforts.22
A third model holds multiculturalism to be problematic for the
reason that coherent national identities provide the type of non-
strategic social integration required by liberal democracies, and
that civic ties are not enough for the job.23  Dubbed "liberal
nationalism," this perspective rejects the idea that liberal
democracies require ethno-cultural cores, such as the entrenchment
of Anglo-Protestantism, but recognizes the need for a cultural core
of shared experiences and history. This focus on the role of the
nation is at odds with the developments cited by Anaya in
international human rights law and the emphasis on cultural
pluralism, but only to the extent that political pluralism collides
with the social integration required by liberal democracies. 24
After fleshing out the assimilation and liberal nationalism
models by building on some of Gerry Simpson's work on
liberalism in international law, Part II provides more substantial
discussion on the emergence of group rights and the multicultural
ideal. It does so by first exploring some of the debate in liberal
political theory on membership rules and cultural identity, and
then by looking to the content of the two United Nations
Declarations on Minority Rights and Indigenous Rights.
Part II is consequently concerned with exploring the various
ways that liberal ambivalences have opened up space for a number
of competing visions of how national identities, political
21 Id.
22 Will Kymlicka has the made most systematic attempts at arguing for liberal
multiculturalism. KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 343-70.
23 DAVID MILLER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 32 (2000); YAEL TAMIR,
LIBERAL NATIONALISM 33 (1993); Robert Dahl, Democratizing Institutions, in
DEMOCRACY'S EDGES 32 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1999). The distinction between integration
types was developed by Jurgen Habermas, and is summarized by Professor Arash
Abizadeh: "Contemporary social theorists such as Habermas (1984-87) distinguish
between system integration (which coordinates action via strategic interaction) and social
integration (which coordinates action via linguistically mediated norms and processes of
reaching understanding) and claim that the social solidarity required by well-ordered
societies depends at least in part upon social integration." Arash Abizadeh, Does Liberal
Democracy Presuppose a Liberal Nation? Four Arguments, 96 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 495,
495 (2002).
24 Tamir writes, "Liberalism is taken as the starting point .... TAMIR, supra note
23, at 4.
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communities, and membership rules should be established. Part
III then asks whether any one of the three liberal nation-building
models appear to have a command on the principles and practice
shaping the development of the American nation, and by way of
example, looks to the legal status of Native American Indians. In
light of the constitutional contours of the American Indian legal
experience, the discussion is mostly concerned with juridical
developments at the expense of legislative ones. Part IV begins a
very short answer to the questions posed in Part III by transposing
the fundamentals of the contemporary picture in American Indian
law with the three models of political community. The article
concludes by emphasizing the usefulness in recognizing confusion
in international law to be a real thing, and to the extent partisans
invoke "the international" as inherently anti-conservative, they are
misconstruing the recipes at play in American nation-building
projects.
II. Three Models of Political Community and Nationalism in
International Law
The terms "political community" and "national identity" are
not synonymous. A political community as an abstract matter
does not depend on ethnicity, race, gender, culture, nationality,
religion, or any other ascriptive characteristic. 25  As some have
argued, political communities may be cosmopolitan or "post-
national," crossing borders and cultures along ethical or
ideological lines. National communities, in contrast, are
typically understood to have "concrete" advantages over these
abstractions because their members share common histories,
cultures, and solidarity stable enough for sacrifice. 27 As Joseph
25 See generally NATIONALISM (John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1994);
David Held, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1996).
26 See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, 271-72 (1995); JURGEN
HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION 58-112 (2001) (questioning how "an
association of free and equal citizens can be constructed through the means of positive
law"); Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global People's
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INTL. L. 191
(2000) (espousing the view that "empowerment would likely be set in motion as
observers sympathetic to global democracy... began to fashion formal legal arguments
as to why its resolutions should be considered binding .... ").
27 MILLER, supra note 23, at 32. For discussion, see Arash Abizadeh, Liberal
Nationalist Versus Postnational Social Integration: On the Nation's Ethno-Cultural
[Vol. 31
LIBERAL AMBIVALENCE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Nye has suggested, the problem with political communities that
lack national cores is that its members will be unwilling to make
sacrifices for people when meaningful connections have not been
created.28
While it is important to understand that political communities
can be post-national-and consequently something quite
different from "national" communities-a particular theoretical
framework's perspective on political community will likely have
consequences on the way it conceives the role of the nation. This
part explores this idea by examining three models in international
law that explicitly deal with political community. After
articulating the premises in each model, this article discusses a
corollary view point with respect to national identity.
A. Charter Liberalism and Tomato Soup
1. Charter Liberalism
Professor Gerry Simpson has suggested that the twenty-first
century is witnessing "a struggle in train for the soul of
international law.' 29  In his view this struggle concerns, among
other things, a contest between two familiar yet competing images
of liberal political theory in international law.30 The first image is
what he calls "Charter liberalism," an image in which the
orientation of a political community, whether it be socialist,
totalitarian, or liberal democratic, plays no part in the recognition
it will receive by the United Nations or the international
community. 31  Professor Simpson calls it "Charter liberalism"
because "the principles underlying this approach find their highest
Particularity and Concreteness, 10 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 231 (2004).
28 Professors Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane provide an illustration: "A
cosmopolitan view.., that treats the globe as one constituency implies the existence of a
political community in which citizens of 198 states would be willing to be continually
outvoted by a billion Chinese and a billion Indians." In national contexts, "minorities are
willing to acquiesce to a majority in which they may not participate directly because they
feel they participate is some larger community." Joseph Nye & Robert Keohane,
Introduction, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 33 (Joseph Nye & Robert
Keohane eds., 2000).
29 Gerry Simpson, The Situation on the International Legal Theory Front: The
Power of Rules and the Rules of Power, 11 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 439, 459 (2000).
30 Simpson, supra note 11, at 541.
31 Id.
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expression in the text of the UN Charter." 32 In this sense, states
are treated much like individuals in the domestic order, where the
tenet of liberal neutrality demands the state to keep a hands-off
policy with respect to personal decisions on the "good life." 3 3
States, like individuals, are guaranteed equality and the freedom to
self-determine their life-stories through sovereign independence.34
Charter liberalism is consequently quite pluralistic in that it is non-
discriminatory and emphasizes liberal procedures over the notion
of substantive ideas of what is best. 3
5
The salience of this image came into focus after World War II,
and it is important to note the friendly relationship between
Charter liberalism and the development of human rights law.
Determined to construct an international architecture that might
better prevent similar types of citizen abuse and threats to
36international peace, the U.N. system was formed. Fundamental
to this new architecture was the assemblage of a body of human
rights that all states would be bound to respect and protect. 37 The
extent to which states were actually bound, however, was
substantially limited due to the powerful effect of the sovereignty
concept.38 States would be bound to human rights norms only to
the degree they would consent to bind themselves. A sovereign
state has the final right to domestic jurisdiction, and can only be
regarded as susceptible to human rights law when it has so
consented. 39  Thus, a body of human rights was born meant to
32 Id.
33 For a thorough discussion of how states came to this particular conception, see
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles 144-205 (2002).
34 Id. at 540-41.
35 Id.
36 See Burns Weston, Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER
526 (Burns Weston et al. eds., 1997).
37 See id.
38 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?
106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (advocating that "the constructive role of international law in
post-Cold War era will be greatly enhanced if nongovernmental organizations seek self-
consciously to participate in, influence, and ultimately enforce transnational legal process
by promoting the internalization of international norms into domestic law ....");
MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE
(1995) (stating that sovereignty stands for "freedom of action by states when the need is
for central coordination and control ....").
39 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (2003).
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protect citizens from their governments, but only to the extent that
governments would allow them to be protected.
40
This rule is explicit in all the major human rights documents.
The U.N. Charter reads in its first organizing principle: "The
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its members ' 41 and "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under
the present Charter. . .. .42 Though Article 4 of the Charter reads
that membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving
states, there is nothing explicit in the Charter that bars human
rights violators from obtaining U.N. membership. The protection
of human rights is encouraged throughout the Charter, but in the
end only becomes enforceable when a state decides to let them be
enforced.43
Alongside the creation of the U.N. Charter was a desire to
create an international bill of rights. The basic document targeting
this goal emerged as a Declaration in 1948 and was powerfully
anti-pluralist in most of its universal norms.4 4 Much of the
formative content of international human rights law draws on the
Declaration of Human Rights, spanning the chasm from political
and civil rights to social and economic rights.45 Unfortunately, the
Declaration had very little hortatory power due to its non-legal
status, and attempts were subsequently made to codify the
principles in conventions that would have the power to bind
46states. It would take eighteen years for the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights47 and its
40 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 290-302 (1951).
41 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1.
42 Id. 7.
43 Id. art. 4.
44 See generally id. (emphasizing that the Charter is not binding unless states so
choose).
45 See Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (June 1996), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm.
46 PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 241-
80 (1998).
47 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
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sibling Covenant on Civil and Political Rights48 to enter into force.
Such duration could partly be chalked up to the genuine
unwillingness of states to chip away at their sovereign
independence and may suggest that the Declaration was not as
representative of state opinion as its authors would have desired.49
Illustrative of Charter liberalist residue is the very first line in
both Covenants: "All peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development." It goes on to read, "The States Parties to the
present Covenant ... shall promote the realization of the right of
self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." 5' States that
have ratified the Civil and Political Covenant subject themselves
to the authority of the Human Rights Con-nittee. 52  This
committee was created by the Covenant, with a mission to receive
reports from states concerning their human rights records and
consequently issue its own reports on the efficacy of states in their
alignment with human rights prescriptions. 53 If a state ratifies the
separate Optional Protocol to the Covenant, it allows its citizens to
bring claims against it for human rights abuses.54
2. Tomato Soup
With respect to the formation of political communities, Charter
liberalism clearly emphasizes the "state" as the appropriate unit of
analysis. The international legal principles at work favor the rights
of states to self-determination and promote a pluralistic
perspective on how those states decide to politically organize
themselves. This pluralism, however, only goes this far, stopping
at the territorial borders of state sovereignty; the question of
48 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
49 LAUREN, supra note 46, at 241-80.
50 ICCPR, supra note 48, art. 1, § 1; ICESCR, supra note 47, art. 1, § 1.
51 Id. art. 1, § 3.
52 Id. art. 28, § 1.
53 Id. arts. 40-42.
54 See Sian Lewis-Anthony, Treaty-Based Procedures for the Making of Human
Rights Complaints within the U.N. System, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICE 41-43 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1999).
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whether sub-national groups might have cognizable claims against
states at international law is firmly answered in the negative.
55
Pluralism in the colloquial context is out of bounds as this would
implicate the domestic ordering of the state and the relative
freedoms allowed citizens and groups.
56
Charter liberalism's focus on state sovereignty was
traditionally an emphasis synonymously placed on nations as well,
conflating the distinction between the state's reference to legal
powers and the nation's reference to ethno-cultural solidarity.57
Indeed, "nation-state" is a term comfortably within Charter
liberalism's pluralistic scope, assuming the borders of national
membership neatly coincide with the territorial borders of the
state. The term "nation-state" ultimately makes invisible the
distinction between liberal governance neutral to cultural goods
and the cultural quality of national membership. International law
performing in the charter sense is concerned with the behavior of
states, not nations. It is this confluence of the ethno-
cultural/national with the state that finds ready expression in
Huntington's assimilationist nationalism.
It should be noted that Huntington's version of assimilationist
theory does not, as does Charter liberalism, view the nation as an
invisible yet inevitable aspect of the sovereign state. On the
contrary, Huntington is worried that if trends keep apace, the
American nation that has long been the center-piece of the United
States will be lost to the overwhelming effects of Hispanic
immigration and cosmopolitanism. 58  The normative stakes
involve the need to recapture what made America in the first place,
and that has, at least until the late twentieth century, always
provided the socio-cultural-political capital for liberal democracy.
It is this capital that Huntington describes as tomato soup-the
powerfully compelling stuff that has always been able to
55 S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-23 (2004).
56 Simpson, supra note 11, at 548.
57 Michael R. Fowler & Julie M. Bunck, The Nation Neglected: The Organization
of International Life in the Classical State Sovereignty Period, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE RISE OF NATIONS 40 (Robert J. Beck & Thomas Ambrosio eds., 2002). See
generally Nathaniel Berman, But the Alternative Is Despair: European Nationalism and
the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1792 (1992-1993) (For
discussion on the complex relationship between international legal prescription and
nationalism in the inter-war years.).
58 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 221-51, 264-72.
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assimilate immigrants. 59 The problem of today is that there are too
many cooks in the kitchen.
Huntington's emphasis on assimilation as the key for national
identity rests on several claims. The first is the dismissal of a
classic dichotomy in nationalist theory that is the distinction
between civic and ethnic nations.60 This idea posited the notion
that while some nations have formed along civic, ideological, or
ethical lines with open borders and an inclusive membership, other
nations have retained closed boundaries where membership was
constituted by ethnicity, culture, language, religion, and similarly
"concrete" forms of identity. 6 1 Huntington's rationale for viewing
this as a false dichotomy, at least in the United States, turns on a
historical interpretation of the early role of white, Anglo-Protestant
settlers. These people preceded the founders and were not
"immigrants." An immigrant to the United States is a person
who wants to become a part of the society the settlers created...
[and] [u]nlike settlers, they experienced 'culture shock' as they
and their offspring attempted to absorb a culture often much at
odds with that which they brought with them. Before
immigrants could come to America, settlers had to found
62America.
In this sense it is misleading to describe America as a "Nation
of Immigrants ' 63 since the phrase implies an egalitarian,
amorphous, diverse association. While Americans are committed
to equality, reform, and diversity, Huntington argues that these
admirable qualities are the exclusive product of a culture formed
by seventeenth and eighteenth century settlers. To quote at more
length:
The central elements of that culture . . .include the Christian
religion, Protestant values and moralism, a work ethic, the
English language, British traditions of law, justice, and the limits
of government power, and a legacy of European art, literature,
59 Id. at 129. For a less accommodating take on this history, see Hiroshi
Motomura, Americans in Waiting (forthcoming 2006).
60 Id. at 29-30.
61 ANTHONY SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS 134-38 (1986). Civic nations
are bound by territory, legal codes, shared citizenship, and ideology, whereas the
population of an ethnic nation shares blood ties, language, history, and culture. Id.
62 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 40.
63 Id. at 39.
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philosophy, and music. Out of this culture the settlers developed
.. . the American Creed with its principles of liberty, equality,
individualism, representative government, and private property.
Subsequent generations of immigrants were assimilated into the
culture of the founding settlers and contributed to and modified
it. But they did not change it fundamentally. 64
At least two points are evident in this passage. The first is that
Huntington is using "culture" as a catch-all phrase to include the
manifestations of politics, economics, morality, and ethnicity. The
second is that his argument for conflating the old division between
civic and ethnic nations comes from his belief that, in the
American context, the civic aspects of the so-called "American
Creed" are inextricably tied to a special group of people and their
culture. If Anglo-Protestants had not founded the United States,
the Creed would simply not exist.
6 5
Today, Huntington believes all of this to be in jeopardy, that
the "nation" in nation-state can no longer be taken for granted, and
he identifies four trends as substantially responsible for this
unhinging. These are: the popularity of the multiculturalists model
and its celebration of sub-national identities at the expense of a
solidified "white consciousness," the resistance of Hispanic
immigrants to assimilation, the dilution of the English language as
the official language, and the emergence of post- and trans-
national identities. Considering my purpose in showing the
connection between Charter liberalism and Huntington's
assimilation, this article will focus only on the first of these: the
rise of multiculturalism. On the one hand, notes Huntington,
multiculturalism will not be problematic to the extent that it is
64 Id. at 40-41.
65 Id. at 59. Huntington asks and answers: "Would America be the America it is
today if in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it had been settled not by British
Protestants but by French, Spanish, or Portuguese Catholics? The answer is no. It would
not be America; it would be Quebec, Mexico, or Brazil." Id. For more critical
interpretations, see RETHINKING AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE (Thomas Bender
ed., 2002), CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES (Ida Susser & Thomas C.
Patterson eds., 2001), INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, Vol. One - Through
Reconstruction (Francis G. Couvares et al. eds., 2000), NEW AMERICAN HISTORY, Eric
Foner (1997), and Gordon Wood, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787
(1998).
66 Id. at 295.
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actually identified as multiracialism.6 7  The existence of race
serves as an obstacle to a consolidated national identity due to its
implications for differentiated identity as race increasingly
dissolves with inter-marriage; however, a favorable result is
reached to the extent that it gives individuals one less reason to
think of themselves as different from their neighbors. 68  The
difference here is that Huntington is talking about the advent of
multiracial individuals-not multicultural groups. 69 This merging
of ascriptive identities is therefore good for keeping tomato soup's
consistency, but it is bad for its effects on the recipe's core
ingredient: "white people." Due to this evaporation of race and
ethnicity in the United States, non-whites increasingly identify
their ethnicity in hyphenated terms. 70 A presumptive result for so-
called "whites" would therefore be for them to call themselves
European-American, but this would not only be descriptively
inaccurate due to the originality borne in the settler experience, it
would be normatively unacceptable for the imprimatur it would
stamp on the ascendance of sub-national identities.71
Alternatively, says Huntington, it is problematic for whites to
continue identifying themselves as "whites" due to the term's
72intrinsically racist history.
The preferred route is to make a move that would strengthen
national identity and national unity, and that would be for white
people to simply call themselves "Americans. 73  By labeling
themselves as Americans, former whites would be doing two
things at once. First, the American label would formalize the idea
that America is not a nation of immigrants, capturing what
Huntington described as the Anglo-Protestant cultural core, and
highlighting that culture as something decidedly distinct from the
cultures of other peoples.74 Secondly, it would establish itself as a
non-racial cultural core accessible to every citizen of the United
States through an actively assimilationist agenda. That is to say,
67 Id.
68 See HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 304.
69 Id. at 306.
70 Id. at 306-07.
71 Id. at 300-01.
72 Id. at 301.
73 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 303.
74 Id. at 363.
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Huntington's tomato soup would once again be all-American
inasmuch as the settler-descendants take a nativist command of the
cultural core, while remaining available to all citizens on the basis
of the Creed's egalitarianism and the de-racializing consequences
of multiracialism. This is a nationalism "devoted to the
preservation and enhancement of those qualities that have defined
America since its founding ' 75 with the desired consequence of
once again reconciling the terms "America" and "United States" as
nation and state.
B. Liberal Anti-Pluralism and Liberal Nationalism
1. Liberal Anti-Pluralism
In contrast to Charter liberalism, Simpson describes "liberal
anti-pluralism" as an "evangelical doctrine . . . [that] views
liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine or a social good worth
,,76promoting. Whereas Charter liberalism focused on what
amounted to a state right to political diversity, liberal anti-
pluralism suggests liberal democracy and individual rights as the77
sine qua non of governmental form. This view suggests that
states that do not adopt the liberal democratic stance should not be
recognized in the international order since they have violated
individual rights.
78
Simpson identifies this liberal image as anti-pluralist because
of its focus on universal standards and prescriptions for a
discriminative order which allows access and participation only to
liberal democratic states.79 Where Charter liberalism situates an
international order in which any state that meets the traditional
sovereign requirements may participate in international affairs
(thus recognizing a type of political pluralism), liberal anti-
pluralism advocates a requisite governmental style in the form of
liberal democracy. Charter liberalism is therefore concerned with
the rights of states and largely oblivious to the rights of civil
societies and individuals, while liberal anti-pluralism demands a
75 Id. at 365.
76 Simpson, supra note 11, at 540.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 541.
79 Simpson associates liberal anti-pluralism with the work of Michael Reisman,
Fernando Teson, Thomas Franck, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Id. at 537.
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single choice for states such that individuals will have the greatest
latitude in their decision-making.
As discussed above, human rights have a historical connection
with Charter liberalism. Liberal anti-pluralism, with its focus on
democracy and human rights, clearly has its own claims on
human rights doctrine as well. Indeed, Simpson has argued,
"International human rights law with its intellectual roots in the
enlightenment and its emphasis on popular sovereignty and civil
rights is the engine of this new liberal anti-pluralism."80  In
contrast to its Westphalian lineage, human rights as liberal anti-
pluralism has been a more recent phenomenon. The right to
participate in the international order, which traditionally was
granted to any state with de facto control over its territory and
populace, has given way to the emergence of a new admissions
policy based on human rights records and democratic structure
which could cause trouble for "hard-core abstainers, such as the
totalitarian governments of Myanmar, North Korea, and China."
82
Liberal anti-pluralists go where traditional human rights were
never able; they claim that not only should governments not be
free to determine how they treat their citizens, but that all
governments should be democracies.
83
Universalism-the basic justification for human rights-is the
belief that certain rights and freedoms naturally derive from one's
humanity regardless of religion, sex, nationality, race, or any other
social distinction. 84  As Alison Renteln has suggested, a human
80 Id. at 541.
81 Id. at 556-70. "Westphalian" sovereignty is a label commonly used to refer to
the system of international order associated with states as the exclusive and fundamental
units of analysis in international law. See, e.g., Martii Koskenniemi, The Future of
Statehood, 32 HARv. INT'L. L. J. 397, 397 (1991).
82 Thomas Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (Gregory Fox & Brad Roth eds., 2000). For
further discussion on liberal and illiberal states and the normative arguments for pushing
such distinctions, see Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary Human Rights Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990). Cf Jose Alvarez, Do
Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L.
L. 183 (2001) (arguing against democratic peace theory and the application of liberal
international relations theory to international law).
83 Simpson, supra note 11, at 558.
84 See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 714-45 (Bums Weston et al. eds.,
1997) (discussing of universalism and relativism in human rights).
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right "is a universal moral right, something which all men,
everywhere, at all times ought to have, something of which no one
may be deprived without a grave affront to justice, something
which is owing to every human being simply because he is
human.' 85 A universalist is therefore capable, like liberal anti-
pluralists, to call for humanitarian intervention not only when
threats to international peace are at stake, but also when
governments are abusing the human rights of their citizens. 86 An
additional justification is the belief that because governments are
driven by the preferences of individuals and groups, and not fixed
exogenous interests, a leader who abuses his subjects will just as
easily be an aggressor on the international field. It is, therefore,
the business of the international community what type of political
organization a particular state decides to adopt, and if it decides
too far in favor of illiberal consequences, military responses may
be deemed appropriate.
88
2. Liberal Nationalism
Professor Simpson described liberal anti-pluralism as
evangelical because of the propensity on the part of its proponents
to suggest liberal democracy as a peremptory norm itself due to
the rights of individuals to have an accountable government in
which they can participate in official decision-making. Unlike
charter liberalism's passive conflation of the "nation-state," liberal
nationalism's focus on democratic governance and legitimacy
aggressively engages the concept of political community.89 This
revision takes place, however, only with respect to the state: the
disaggregation of its sovereign powers, the opening up of
individual rights, and the ascendance of transnational networks.
The nation, in contrast, skirts analysis and remains wholly intact,
85 ALISON RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 47 (1990).
86 See The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The
Responsibility to Protect (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS]; see also BRIAN LEPARD,
RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2002) (reviewing recent development of
such arguments).
87 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 240, 246 (2000).
88 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the U.N., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (including commentary in support of the Iraq war).
89 Nye & Keohane, supra note 28, at 32-36.
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playing the default role for the enabling of liberal democracy and
individual rights. The problem with alternatives to the national
orientation, according to this view, is that popular conceptions like
cosmopolitan democracy are geared towards a post-national
identity that inevitably invokes "democratic deficits"-gaps
between the capacity of individual citizens to provide meaningful
input into the decision-making process generated by accountable
governmental officials.
90
Liberal anti-pluralism thus speaks of individual rights, but
nonetheless requires the existence of sovereign states-a
relationship that makes additional sense when we recall the
relationship between human rights and charter liberalism. To be
sure, the pro-democracy movement does not accept Westphalian
sovereignty; sovereignty in this liberal version is disaggregated,
complex, and transnational. 9 1  The bottom line for present
purposes is that liberal anti-pluralists focus on the need for
democracies to remain national, even in the "new world order."
92
This particular liberal preoccupation with the role of the nation
has a counterpart in political theory. David Miller argues that
liberal nationalism merges liberty and equality (the so-called
American Creed) with a theory of nation-building that at once
allows individuals to freely and equally deliberate on the
mechanics and substance of official decision-making and
successfully maintains solidarity among various sub-
nationalities. 93 Solidarity is essential for any political community,
but its sustainability becomes greater the larger the population
becomes and the more market-driven its economics. Miller
suggests, as does Huntington, that "nationality is de facto the main
source of such solidarity."
95
Liberal nationalism and assimilationism part ways, however, in
90 Id.; see also Dahl, supra note 23, at 31.
91 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order,
40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283 (2003); John Jackson, Sovereignty-Modem: A New Approach to
an Out-Dated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2004); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
AGREEMENTS (1995).
92 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
93 MILLER, supra note 23, at 3 1; see also TAMIR, supra note 23.
94 MILLER, supra note 23, at 32.
95 Id.
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the elasticity each attributes to the capacity for national identities
to be inclusive. Where Huntington's tomato soup paradigm
suggested a highly restrictive relationship between Anglo-
Protestants and America's national identity, Miller argues that the
imaginative quality of national identity provides room for "people
of different political persuasions to share a political loyalty,
defining themselves against a common background whose outlines
are not precise, and which therefore lends itself to competing
interpretations. ' 96  Quite unlike tomato soup, Miller believes
nationality to be "associated with no particular social programme:
the flexible content of national identity allows parties of different
colours to present their programmes as the true continuation of the
national tradition and the true reflection of national character."
97
It sounds like liberal nationalism wants to have its cake and eat
it too. It argues in favor of national identities as being
presumptively positive and the best model for achieving the kind
of non-strategic social integration required by large-scale liberal
democracies. At the same time, however, Miller is unwilling to
follow the low road taken by Huntington where particular socio-
cultural-religious contents constitute the national idea. Instead,
Miller invokes the more familiar liberal terrain of political
pluralism by opening the doors to multiculturalism after all. This
is what liberal democracies are supposed to be all about. How is
it, then, that liberal nationalism bridges the gap between a coercive
and assimilationist nationalism and liberal pluralism? Miller's
answer is elusive: "The place where the line is drawn will be
specific to a particular nationality at a particular time, and it will
be subject for debate whether its present position is appropriate or
not."98 Somehow the liberal nationalist project aims to sustain a
national identity with real and substantive norms, and at the same
time be thin enough to allow for those not belonging to the
dominant culture sufficient leeway in expressing their sub-national
identities. 9
9
This article will return to how liberal nationalism meaningfully
attempts to distinguish itself from a purely assimilationist model in
96 Id.; see HUNTINGTON, supra note 1.
97 Id. at 33.
98 Id. at 34.
99 Id. at 35-36.
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Part IV, but for now it is enough to conclude that liberal
nationalism accurately reflects liberal anti-pluralism in
international law. Both theories are committed to pluralistic
politics, but only to the extent that the diversity never reaches the
structural levels of the state. States should not have the choice to
structurally diversify, but should be constituted by national liberal
democracies. Echoing the liberal nationalist thesis, Professors Nye
and Keohane have written, "[n]othing plays the integrative role
that occurs within well-ordered nation-states."'1
00
C. Multiculturalism and International Human Rights Law
1. Liberalism's Late Embrace: Multiculturalism and
Group Rights
Where Charter liberalism focused on the sovereign state and
liberal anti-pluralism on democracy and individual rights, an
anomalous creature has been quietly at work in international law: a
stream of rights belonging to sub-national groups. 10 1  For
centuries, states have resisted the idea of group rights, but as will
be discussed, the arrival of such rights may finally be upon us.102
To the extent the emergence of group rights in international law
has been a liberal project, it is situated quite differently than the
two images discussed by Simpson, and it may be for this reason
that group rights and multiculturalism do not appear in his article.
In fact, the historical difficulties faced by group rights advocates
have often been liberal creations, either with respect to (1) the
rights states have claimed against sub-national groups due to fears
of secession; or (2) the conflict between group and individual
rights. The fact that multiculturalism presently claims a liberal
base is a result of political theorizing only done in the last decades
of the twentieth century.' 
03
It is important to note at this point a distinction between
100 Nye & Keohane, supra note 28, at 30.
101 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2003);
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990); ANAYA,
supra note 55.
102 ANAYA, supra note 55, at 49-58 (arguing that customary norms concerning the
rights belonging to indigenous peoples have emerged).
103 Multiculturalism may have a liberal heritage in terms of diversity and state
neutrality with respect to cultural goods. To the extent that multiculturalism is associated
with group rights, the liberal relationship is new. KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 336.
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"multiculturalism" and "group rights" since they are often used
interchangeably or in connection with one another. At a very
simple level, multiculturalism can refer to a society that is
descriptively diverse in its cultural populations; in an empirical
sense, this is a multicultural society. Multiculturalism can also be
used normatively, however, by referring to a society that actively
seeks to promote multicultural governance and cultural diversity.
Here, multiculturalism primarily is ventured as a normative
program: as this program argues, respect for cultural diversity is a
manifestation of the liberal state's theoretical commitment to
substantive neutrality with respect to ethno-cultural-religious
goods.
A disjuncture appears, however, when we are reminded that
the neutral respect is generally understood to have a negative
orientation; liberal governments are supposed to refrain from
oppressive action and not actively advocate on behalf of special
groups. The distance between the liberal project and
multiculturalism extends further when we remember that liberal
neutrality is preoccupied with the rights of individuals, not groups,
to self-determination. It is here that a difference between
"multiculturalism" and "group rights" becomes clear at the ground
level. Whereas a liberal society might very well take a favorable
view on multiculturalism to the extent that it means equal respect
for cultural dispositions, it is far less friendly to the idea of
attributing rights to groups in the same way as attributing rights to
individuals.1 4 Illustrative of the problem: which trumps when a
group right collides with the right of an individual?
Peter Jones explains that this collision can in part be reconciled
by determining whether an entity has moral standing-in violating
a right, are you wronging the holder of that alleged right? 10 5 In
other words, for an entity to hold a right, it must have moral
standing. If it has moral standing, the entity can possess moral
104 It is for this reason, for example, that the U.S. Constitution entitles individuals
and not groups in its Bill of Rights, and why group-specific programs like affirmative
action are so controversial. The notion that groups such as African-Americans might
enjoy remedial benefits through affirmative action in the United States has been
discounted by the U.S. Supreme Court. The only available legal rationale for group
cognizance, in this context, is a prospective interest in diversity. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
105 Peter JONES, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 361-62
(1999).
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entitlements, which concurrently act as sources of moral
obligations for others. 106 Jones suggests that there are two ways of
conceiving "group rights." The first conception follows Joseph
Raz in his formulation of "collective rights."' 0 7 Group rights in
their collective sense are based on an interest theory of rights in
which a right exists, first and foremost, if there is an interest
sufficiently strong to create a duty in another. Following this
premise, Raz explains that "these interests are the interests of
individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is
a right to that public ood because it serves their interests as
members of the group." The resulting aggregation of interests
appears to be a group right, but the moral basis of the right lies in
its members severally. A solitary individual interest may lack the
force to create a duty, but the aggregated interests of those
interests do have that force, and so individuals will be unable to
exercise group claims in the absence of the group itself.1°9 It is
therefore wrong to think of collective rights as group rights per se
since the moral standing supporting the claim is actually supplied
by individuals, and not the group itself: "A right is a group right
only if it is a right held by a group qua group."'
110
The second conception delivers moral standing to the group
itself, and in so doing steers furthest from traditional liberal
principles. This form of corporatism 1 ' differs from collectivism
because the corporate model assumes that group status itself bears
the moral standing necessary to claim rights, regardless of the
individually aggregated rights that might or might not lie at its
core.112 As Jones suggests,
U]ust as an individual has an identity and a standing as a person
independently and in advance of the interests or rights that he or
she possesses, so a group that bears a corporate right must have
an identity and standing independently and in advance of the
interests it has and the rights it bears. Its being a group with
moral standing as a group is a logical prerequisite of its being an
106 Id.
107 Id. at 356-60; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207-08 (1986).
108 JONES, supra note 105, at 357 (quoting RAZ, supra note 107).
109 Id. at 356.
110 Id. at 354.
M'' Id. at 361.
112 Id. at 363.
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entity that can bear corporate rights. So the 'groupness' of
groups, for right-holding purposes, is understood quite
differently by these two conceptions." 
3
There is serious tension in international law between the
collective and corporate forms of group rights. As discussed
below, this tension takes clearest shape in the divisions between
the U.N. declaration dedicated to minorities and the draft
declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. Like the Boston
Red Sox and the New York Yankees, however, the rivalry between
collective and corporate forms of group rights has only recently
taken on the features of a meaningful contest. Minority rights in
international law are collective rights, at best" 4 accessible only to
individuals belonging to certain identifiable groups, and the moral
basis for these rights lies with the individuals themselves-not
with the group qua group. 115 In contrast, the Draft Declaration on
Indigenous Rights is heavily corporatist. Before moving into the
history of these two movements and the present state of the law, it
is useful to see how developments in political theory have made a
cognizable impact on the place of multiculturalism and group
rights in international law.
A compelling critique of liberal democracy in the 1980s
alternatively went under the guises of "communitarianism,"
"identity politics," "the politics of recognition," "multiculturalism,"
and what Huntington pejoratively calls "deconstructionism. ' 11 6
These theories have been articulated in different settings by
different scholars, but a common thrust was that the liberal
emphasis on the individual was not as neutral in practice as the
theory claimed, and the concomitant effects on community values
113 Id.
114 Jones writes, "The interest of any one individual may not suffice to justify
imposing duties on the larger society to institute measures to protect and sustain that
culture. But the joint interest of all members may suffice, in which case we can ascribe
the appropriate group right to the minority." JONES, supra note 105, at 357. This
rationale is at odds, however, with the explicit characterization by the United Nations of
minority rights as individual rights. Infra text accompanying notes 179-216.
115 JONES, supra note 105, at 354.
116 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 141. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY (2000); MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT (1996); SEYLA
BENHABIB, DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
POLITICAL (1996).
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had been deleterious.1 17  It was argued that liberal neutrality
functioned to privilege the individual sitting at the top of the
cultural food chain, that is, Huntington's Anglo-Protestant
everyman. This privileging has an impact on which types of
cultures are favored and which are not, resulting in the systematic
silencing and assimilation of non-members. 118 As the politics of
the 1960s and 1970s bore fruit, assimilated groups lost their taste
for tomato soup. It had become unacceptable for membership in
the political community to be gauged by individualized
citizenship, and cultural determinism demanded "group-specific
forms of citizenship" as a means of either doing away with
national identity or reconstructing a national identity that was
multi-colored. 11
In the twenty-first century, the heart of the multicultural
complaint is common knowledge and, as Huntington has
suggested, it is precisely this critique which has motivated the
present identity crisis in the United States. 120 However, how is it
that what was initially a searing attack on liberalism has been co-
opted, resulting in liberal arguments for group-specific forms of
citizenship and identity? Will Kymlicka constructs the argument
in three phases, and suggests that the communitarian critique of
liberalism was the first. 12 1 This critique helped unearth the heart
of the problem, which was that the atomistic individual was not an
unencumbered self as much as she was embedded in a particular
culture, and to the extent that her culture was nullified, so was her
personal right to self-determination. 122 Kymlicka argues that the
multiculturalism debate moved into a second phase, as it became
apparent that what had appeared to be a symmetry between the
communitarian attack on liberal individualism and the
multicultural attack on assimilationism had evaporated. 123  On
closer examination, it became apparent that there was not a
117 See DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS (1993); see generally
KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 208-73 (summarizing the debate).
118 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 343-47.
119 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 141-58.
120 Id.
121 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 336-37.
122 Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL.
THEORY 81 (1984).
123 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 338.
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conflict between liberalism and non-dominant cultural identity, but
that liberal states had taken on illiberal habits with respect to the
propagation of assimilative social programs. Kymlicka writes,
"the overwhelming majority of debates about multiculturalism are
not debates between a liberal majority and communitarian
minorities, but debates amongst liberals about the meaning of
liberalism."'
124
In the third phase of the multicultural debate, liberal
nationalism parts ways with multiculturalists like James Anaya
and Will Kymlicka. Liberal nationalists recognize the fact that
liberal states actively assimilate its citizens in an attempt to
integrate a solidified national culture. 125 They also recognize the
importance of pluralism and support the elaboration of public
spheres in which sub-national groups are able to meaningfully
contribute to the terms and substance of national policy.
126
However, these recognitions still situate national identity as the
preeminent status. 127  Kymlicka argues that a value hierarchy
where the national identity trumps the sub-national violates the
liberal commitment to neutral governance, despite liberal
nationalist sympathies for pluralist politics. 28 The difference,
Kymlicka suggests, turns on a basic presumption about group
rights. In the liberal nationalist view, the presumption is that while
practice may often privilege the dominant culture, the importance
in sustaining national social integration places the burden on the
sub-national group to show why it deserves special rights.
129
Considering the overwhelming dominance of majority cultures and
the hegemonic power liberal states have in demanding tomato
soup, the liberal commitment to individual self-determination
requires a reversal of this presumption against group rights. The
question for liberal democracies should no longer be whether a
departure from so-called neutral principles can be justified, "but
rather, do majority efforts at nation-building create injustices for
minorities? And if so, do minority rights help protect against these
124 Id.
125 DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995).
126 Id. at 96-98.
127 MILLER, supra note 23, at 32.
128 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 345.
129 Id.
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injustices?" 130
Coming back to a question posed at the beginning of this
section regarding the difficulty in reconciling a collision between a
group right and an individual right when both entities are
considered as having equal moral standing, Kymlicka's response is
that they do not. 13  This liberal multiculturalism highly values
cultural identity, and favors it above a singular national identity,
but when a group right collides with an individual right, the
ultimate liberal emphasis on individualism has to win.' 32 A way
of squaring the problem, on this view, is by distinguishing
between rights of the group against internal dissenters and rights of
the group against the larger society.1 33  On its face this seems
appealing as the former type of internal restrictions seem
undemocratic and illiberal, while the latter type of external
protections seem the very stuff of a society committed to
multiculturalism. 134 The problem will lie in navigating the rocky
territory of which types of internal decisions are illiberal, and
which ones not.'
35
2. Background: Minority Rights
Just as the emergence of a liberal view of group rights has been
a recent development in the theorization of political community, it
is a newcomer in international law as well. The concurrence is
not coincidental, however, with documents like the two U.N.
Declarations evolving against the setting of the three phases
described by Kymlicka. This section provides a historical survey
130 Id. at 347.
131 Id. at 339.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 340-41.
135 Kymlicka writes: "What we need ... is a consistent theory of permissible forms
of nation-building within national democracies. I do not think that political theorists
have yet developed such a theory." Id. at 352. For further discussion on "illiberalism,"
see Fareed Zakaria, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD (2003); Symposium on "Liberalism and Illiberalism," 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 625 (2002), Gerry Simpson, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES (2004).
136 I do not mean to suggest that group rights are unfamiliar in the international
context, since they are not. Rather, it is the successful emergence of instruments
affiliated with the human rights movement declaring rights adhering to minorities and
indigenous peoples that is novel.
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of the international legal developments.
Minority rights became a project of international concern since
the early twentieth century with the end of World War I and the
creation of the League of Nations. Prior to this time, texts
asserting protection for minorities, and often dealing with religion,
were limited to internal laws, predominately used by European
nations. 137 In the wake of World WarI, the League understood the
relevance of minority rights and its relation to conflict, as
indicated by Woodrow Wilson's words, "Nothing is more likely to
disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in
certain circumstances be meted out to minorities."'1 38 The major
illustration of this commitment was the elaboration of five
"Minorities Treaties" which were concluded among the Allies and
the newly-emerged states. These treaties, inter alia, included the
following: the right to equality of treatment and non-
discrimination of all nationals of the country before the law,
equality of political and civil rights, equality of treatment and
security in law and in fact, the right to citizenship, the right to use
one's own language, and the right to establish, manage, and
control charitable, religious or social institutions, schools, and
other education establishments.13 9 The treaties also included state
obligations, such as the provisions for equitable financial support
for schools, and the "recognition of the supremacy of laws
protecting minority rights over other statutes., 140  Francisco
Capotorti notes that some of the racial, religious, and linguistic
minorities which were able to take shelter under the banner of this
new regime were those in Austria, Poland, the Serb-Croat-Slovene
state, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Greece, the
city of Danzig, the Aland Islands, Turkey, and Iraq. 141
Despite its impressive scope and ambition, the minority rights
regime under the League is largely considered to have been a
failure. 42 For one thing, the system lacked a level of generality
137 FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO
ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 1-4 (1991); HANNUM, supra note 101, at
50-54.
138 Id. at 17 (quoting Woodrow Wilson).
139 Id. at 16-26.
140 Id.; see HANNUM, supra note 101, at 53.
141 CAPOTORTI, supra note 137, at 18.
142 HANNUM, supra note 101, at 53.
2005]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
espoused in its preambular language. 143 "That the system was
neither conceived nor intended for application on a universal or
more general basis was clearly indicated at the Peace Conference,
where a universal approach was specifically rejected in the
drafting . . ."144 The effect of this was to color the protection of
minority rights with a stain of degradation and a limitation on
sovereignty rights, which was only compounded by the fact that
the treaties exclusively related to the duties charged on defeated
states.145  The rights of minorities in Europe were therefore
discussed more than acted on, and it was not until the advent of the
World War H that these claims would receive serious attention.
Unfortunately, the serious attention that minorities would
receive in the mid-twentieth century came, not from the
international community, but from Hitler. After the defeat of the
Axis powers, the formulation of the U.N. Charter in 1945 and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) in
1948146 stood out as proud documents charging the international
community with the responsibility to respect and protect a whole
host of individual rights and state obligations. The Universal
Declaration, however, made no reference to minority rights.'
47
Despite this omission, the U.N. General Assembly was
nonetheless aware of a need to somehow address the minority
question, and subsequently requested the U.N. Economic and
Social Council to produce a thorough study on minorities."' The
eventual product of these deliberations was the formulation of an
article that could be housed in the forthcoming International Bill of
Rights, now known as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 149  The final
text of Article 27, the first and most explicitly legal text regarding
143 CAPOTORTI, supra note 137, at 26.
144 Id. at 25.
145 Id.
146 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc.
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
147 HANNUM, supra note 101, at 58.
148 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/358.
149 For a description of the history of Article 27, see PATRICK THORNBERRY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991); CAPOTORTI, supra note
137, at 31-36.
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minority rights, reads: "In those States in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language."'
' 50
A decade after Article 27 was adopted, momentum increased
in 1979 when Francesco Capotorti-the Special Rapporteur for the
Sub-Commission of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities-
was assigned the task of examining in depth the juridical treatment
of minorities. 151  Capotorti's first hurdle was definitional: "The
preparation of a definition capable of being universally accepted
has always proved a task of such difficulty and complexity that
neither the experts of the field nor the organs of the international
agencies have been able to accomplish it to date."' 52  Some of
the questions that have dogged this process have included, inter
alia: what weight numerical ratios should be given, whether
minorities should be defined by exclusively objective criteria
or a combination of subjective self-identification and positive
elements, whether the origins of minority groups matter, whether
recent immigrant populations should be included, and whether
minorities should only include groups of nationals, excluding
foreign populations. 
153
As Capotorti explained, this definitional issue had practical
consequences. Article 27 refers to "persons belonging to such
minorities" and not minority groups per se. This is important
because it sets the stage for future human rights instruments which
frame minority rights in individual terms, and thus enable
150 ICCPR, supra note 48, art. 27.
151 See CAPOTORTI, supra note 137, at 5.
152 Id.
153 Id. It is important to reemphasize the utility in identifying the moral orientation
of minority rights in international law. As long as it remains conceptually unclear, it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to marry minority rights law with an underlying moral
architecture that will provide it with long-term coherence and sustainability. The
coherence of a legal system depends, in part, on the normative systems from which it
draws inspiration. The coherence, or lack thereof, of minority rights law therefore
depends on its normative bases of justification, and its current location within the
international mode of human rights law means that it draws, paradoxically, from classic
liberal individualism. For a discussion of normative coherence in international legal
theory, see Christian Reus-Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory, 12
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 573 (2001).
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individuals, and not groups, to claim protection under the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR. The rationale for defining minority rights
individualistically was essentially a matter of keeping with
precedent. 154  In discussing the reasons for highlighting
individualism, Capotorti wrote:
The first is historical. In the system of protection of minorities
established in 1919-1920, rights were accorded to individuals
only. The theory of an international personality of minorities
developed later . . . but the treaties and other international
instruments relating to minorities were concerned expressly with
individual rights .... The second reason was the need for a
coherent formulation of the various provisions of [the
Covenants]. The only right of collective bodies is the right of
peoples to self-determination. But this is an entirely different
matter from the rights of members of minorities . . . . Lastly,
there is a political reason. The fact of granting rights to
minorities and thus endowing them with legal status might
increase the danger of friction between them and the state, in so
far as the minority group, as an entity, would seem to be
invested with authority to represent interests of a particular
community vis-A-vis the state representing the interests of the
entire population.' 5
5
According to Article 27, protection under the ICCPR requires
that an individual must belong to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic
group that is not a majority to bring a claim.' 56 If this requirement
is satisfied, the individual has the right to enjoy his own culture,
practice his own religion, and speak his own language. These
rights are further inflated by the effect of the ICCPR's "Basic
Non-Discrimination List"-states are bound to "respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized . . . without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status."' 57
A brief point of clarification is deserved regarding the right to
154 See CAPOTORTI, supra note 137, at 35.
155 Id.
156 This is the crystallization of Jones' articulation of collective rights, where the
rights are essentially individualistic but nonetheless dependent on a group identity.
157 ICCPR, supra note 48, art. 2, § 1.
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non-discrimination and its relation to minority rights. The right to
not be discriminated against, though clearly a component of a
minority rights regime, is necessary but not sufficient in and of
itself.158  After all, if the right to non-discrimination was
synonymous with the concept of "minority rights," minority rights
would be severely redundant. The Sub-Commission has explained
that minority rights differ from the general right to non-
discrimination because these special rights refer to the "protection
of ... non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for
equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of
differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics
which they possess and which distinguish them from the majority
of the population." 
159
Between 1966 and 1992, the year the General Assembly
adopted the U.N. Declaration on the Rights Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Minorities
Declaration [MD]), 160 no other human rights instruments expressly
dealt with the question of minorities, though some guidance can be
found in a handful of documents.' 6 1 Among these have included
Article 13 of the ICESCR,162 the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 163 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
158 Patrick Thornberry, The U.N. Declaration: Backgroud, Analysis, Observations,
in The U.N. Minority Rights Declaration (Alan Phillips & Allan Rosas eds., 1993).
159 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, 1st Sess., § V, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/52 (1947).
160 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item
97(b), U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter MD].
161 UNHCHR.org, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr
.chlhtml/menu2/10/c/minor/min istr.htm. The texts of these documents, as well as other
useful information dealing with minorities, can be found at the Minority Rights page of
the U.N. High Commissioner.
162 ICESCR, supra note 47, art. 13 (concerning the right to education).
163 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Sept. 2, 1990). Article 30 reads:
[I]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of
indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is
indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of
his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or
her own religion, or to use his or her own language.
Id. art. 30.
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Discrimination, 164 and the Genocide Convention. 1
65
With the end of the Cold War, the last decade of the twentieth
century witnessed a veritable explosion in minority rights
movements. 166  The Minorities Declaration was originally
recommended in Capotorti's study, 167 and as a result, the Human
Rights Commission subsequently went about creating a working
group to draft the declaration.' 68  Thirteen years later, the
Minorities Declaration was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
in 1992.
3. Background: Indigenous Rights
Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which,
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
164 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res.
2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (Jan.
4, 1969). Article 2(2) reads:
[S]tates Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social,
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals
belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in
no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights
for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have
been achieved.
Id., art. 2(2).
165 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1948 and entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). Article 2 reads:
[I]n the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
Id. art 2.
166 See Thomas Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity, and Community in
Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RISE OF NATIONS 6 (Robert J. Beck
& Thomas Ambrosio eds., 2002).
167 CAPOTORTI, supra note 137, 617.
168 Draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic,
Religions or Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/L.734 (July 2, 1980).
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societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from the societies now prevailing in those territories, or
parts of them. They form non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations
their ancestral territories and their ethnic identity, as the basis of
their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own
cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal systems.'
6 9
This definition of "indigenous peoples" was established by the
U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1986, and it
encompasses a number of factors, such as ancestry, culture,
ethnicity, and a historical connection to the land. 70 To this extent,
it may appear difficult to distinguish indigenous communities from
minority groups, in that ethnic minorities often claim the same
types of ethno-historical integrity. There are at least two means of
distinguishing the communities. The first includes the perspective
in international law that minority rights are basically individual
rights masquerading as "collective rights," while indigenous rights
sound in terms of "corporate group rights."' 17 1 Another means is a
special relationship with land. 72  Minority groups often claim
cultural integrity and an adamant need for self-definition, but are
not often conceptualized as aboriginal.1 73  It is this relationship
with territorial sovereignty which often supplies the force with
which indigenous communities attempt to distinguish themselves
as "peoples" from "mere minorities."
174
Unlike the interests in protecting minority rights that attended
the League of Nations, the issue of indigenous populations
received its contemporary dose of international concern in 1949,
169 U.N. Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Study of the Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations, 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986f/Add.4, 379
(1986) (Jose R. Martinez Cobo, special rapporteur).
170 Scholars like Professor Benedict Kingsbury suggest that the best way in
navigating attempts at defining indigenous groups is a constructivist one not tied to
specific historical contours. Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples in International
Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 414, 420-
21(1998).
171 This becomes evident in exploring the content of the two declarations. See infra
text accompanying notes 179-216.
172 See ANAYA, supra note 55, at 145-46.
173 See HANNUM, supra note 101, at 89.
174 See ANAYA, supra note 55, at 77-80.
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when the U.N. General Assembly recommended that a study be
conducted on the problem of indigenous communities in the
Americas. 175 This recommendation did not get very far, however,
as the mechanisms for request were dependent on requests from
states, and at least at the time, no state government was willing to
make such a request.1
76
Despite this lapse, indigenous rights emerged a decade later
with the International Labor Organization (ILO) in its Convention
107 of 1957177 which attempted to rectify a prevalent trend in
which governments were using coercive labor practices with
indigenous communities. 178  This included calls for better
education, vocational training, social security, and compensatory
rights for lost land.' 79 The early effort was heavily criticized not
only for its assimilationism and individualist tenor, but for the fact
that indigenous people themselves had little if anything to do with
the drafting of the document. 180 Nonetheless, the ILO was still a
step ahead of the United Nations and any other international
organization, at least in the 1950s.
Another milestone in the development of an international
movement for indigenous rights came in the 1970s and 1980s with
a number of non-governmental conferences.1 81 Unlike the ILO
Convention twenty years earlier, these conferences were heavily
attended by indigenous groups and helped to consolidate the
beginnings of a unified international movement. 182
In 1982, much in response to these events, the U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities created a Working Group on Indigenous Populations in
order to help develop international standards for indigenous rights.
175 G.A. Res. 275 (III) (May 11, 1949).
176 See Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.
649, 657 (1988).
177 Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other
Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, I.L.O. No. 107, 328
U.N.T.S. 247, adopted June 26, 1957, and entered into force June 2, 1959.
178 See ANAYA, supra note 55, at 44.
179 See HANNUM, supra note 101, at 77.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 83.
182 See FRANK WILMER, THE INDIGENOUS VOICE IN WORLD POLITICS: SINCE TIME
IMMEMORIAL (1993).
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Since its establishment, the Working Group has had two basic
projects: the collection of data as incorporated through the
participation of indigenous parties and NGOs, and the
development of a draft declaration. In terms of complaints made
in the early years of its operation, the Working Group heard
reports from more than seventy organizations representing thirty-
three countries.' 83 As Hannum has catalogued, these reports have
included "arbitrary arrests, torture, and killings ... seizure of
indigenous lands ... and the attempted destruction of indigenous
culture and identity through, inter alia, desecration or destruction
of religious sites." 184
It was in 1985 that the Working Group decided to draft a
declaration that would detail the rights to be accorded indigenous
peoples, which was ultimately adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly. 185 The drafting process was in large part a holistic one,
involving the participation by indigenous groups and a number of
states. 186 An effort at revision by the ILO of its Convention 107 of
1957 worked in tamdem with the work of the Sub-Commission
and the Working Group. 187 In 1989, it promulgated Convention
169 in favor of a more contemporary understanding of indigenous
interests.188 Whereas the first convention had been steeped in
assimilationist rhetoric aimed at bringing individuals within the
majority culture and institutional framework, Convention 169
took a more multicultural turn. As Anaya explains, the new
Convention "can be seen as a manifestation toward responsiveness
to indigenous peoples['] demands through international law" as
evidenced in its provisions "advancing indigenous cultural
integrity, land and resource rights, and non-discrimination in social
welfare spheres."'' 8
9
In 1994, the Sub-Commission adopted the Draft Declaration, a
document representing state-of-the-art indigenous rights and self-
determination. This contemporary picture of indigenous rights
poses much more serious threats to states in terms of collective
183 HANNUM, supra note 101, at 84.
184 Id. at 85.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 78.
188 ANAYA, supra note 55, at 47.
189 Id. at 48.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
claims to self-determination than a minority rights regime. It is
likely for this reason that, unlike the MD, the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples has not yet been adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly. The next section examines the two
Declarations, highlighting the major substantive distinctions
between them.
4. The United Nations Declarations
The Minorities Declaration consists of nine articles, and like
Article 27 of the ICCPR, is individualistic in its orientation. 19' Its
title, tellingly, is the Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic
Minorities. In contrast, the Indigenous Declaration is forty-five
articles, and is an explicitly anti-individualistic instrument-it is
the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.192 The
provisions of the Indigenous Declaration are divided into nine
parts, though the major substantive topics include rights to self-
determination and survival; religious, cultural, and linguistic
integrity; education and labor rights; rights to democratic
participation and development; and land and resource rights.
a. Self-Determination and the Non-Discrimination
Principle
It is recognized in international law that the right to self-
determination is a collective one,1 93 and as such, is notably absent
from the MD. For its part, the MD largely takes its cue from the
individualistic tenor of Article 27 of the ICCPR and its protection
of religious, cultural, and ethnic minorities-a perspective largely
rooted in providing persons belonging to such groups with more
muscular protections than the ordinary non-discrimination
principle would provide. At best, this approach moves towards a
190 Id. at 53.
191 For discussion, see Thomberry, supra note 158, at 39-53.
192 Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter ID].
193 See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION
(2004); SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION (StephenMacedo & Allen Buchanan eds.,
2003); SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert McCorquodale ed., 2000).
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Table 1. Locations of Various Topics in the Minorities
Declaration and the Indi enous Declaration
Minorities Indigenous
Declaration Declaration
Self-Determination None Arts. 3, 4, 31-36
Genocide None Arts. 6-11
Religious, Cultural, Arts. 1, 2, 4 Arts. 12-14
Linguistic Identity
Education & Labor Art. 4 Arts. 15-18
Participatory Rights & Art. 2 Arts. 19-24
Development
Land & Resource Rights None Arts. 25-30
Non-Discrimination Arts. 2, 4 Arts. 1-3
type of autonomy to be more or less worked out on the merits of a
given situation. The Indigenous Declaration (ID), however, is
rooted in Article 1 common to the two international covenants:
"All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development."'' 9
4
The ID begins its discussion of self-determination in Article 3,
where it simply provides that indigenous peoples have the right to
self-determination: "By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." 195  Article 31 gives further clarity,
guaranteeing the right to "autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal or local affairs, including culture, religion,
education, information, media, health, housing, employment,
social welfare, economic activities, land and resource
management, environment, and entry by non-members, as well as
ways and means for financing these autonomous functions." 196
Article 32 additionally provides for the collective capacity to
determine indigenous citizenship in accordance with their customs
and traditions.197  Article 33 guarantees juridical process in
accordance with both indigenous customs and international human
194 See supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
195 ID, supra note 192, at 107.
196 Id. at 113.
197 Id.
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rights standards.' 98
To the degree the MD moves towards autonomy-as opposed
to self-determination-the ID picks up on an autonomous theme as
well in its Article 4. Article 4 which provides for the right "to
maintain and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social,
and cultural characteristics," while also allowing for groups to
participate in the "political, economic, social, and cultural life of
the State."1 99 Significantly wedded to an autonomy claim in both
documents is an emphasis on equality and freedom from
discrimination. Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the MD respectively
provide for minority individuals to have the right to enjoy cultural,
religious, and linguistic integrity "freely and without interference
or any form of discrimination"200 and that "[s]tates shall take
measures where required to ensure that persons belonging to
minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights
and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full
equality before the law.' 2° 1 While giving similar protections in
terms of guaranteeing human rights and freedom from
discrimination, the ID asserts such rights in favor of indigenous
peoples and individuals.
b. Genocide
Hannum explains that "[g]enocide has been committed against
indigenous, Indian, or tribal peoples in every region of the world,
and it is in this context that any discussion of indigenous rights
must occur." 20 2 While minorities have suffered their fair share as
well, the MD, in contrast to the ID, is silent on the matter of
physical protection. Part II of the ID begins in Article 6 by
espousing a general collective right to security. Article 7
proscribes "ethnocide and cultural genocide" and provides for
redress in response to assimilation and integration imposed by
"legislative, administrative or other measures. ' '  Article 10
protects against the threat of being forcibly removed from their
198 Id.
199 Id. at 107.
200 Id.
201 ID, supra note 192.
202 HANNUM, supra note 101, at 74-75.
203 ID, supra note 192, at 107-08.
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204lands or territories. Article 11 provides special protection in
times of armed conflict and exhorts the observance of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.20 5 The closest the MD comes to dealing with
security is in Article 1, which orders states to "protect the
existence and the national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
identity of minorities within their respective territories.
' 206
c. Religious, Linguistic, and Cultural Identity
Like Article 27 of the ICCPR, the MD underscores the
importance of cultural, religious, and linguistic independence.
207
Article 2 of the MD, though framing the rights in a positive way,
uses the phrase "have the right to" as opposed to "shall not be
denied the right to" used in Article 27. 20  Article 4 places a
number of substantive obligations on states, including the duty
to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to
minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their
culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where
specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary
to international standards ... to take appropriate measures so
that, whenever possible, [minorities] may have adequate
opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction
in their mother tongue . . . and . . . to consider appropriate
measures so that persons belonging to minorities may participate
fully in the economic progress and development in their
country.2 °9
These provisions, while certainly more muscular than a simple
prohibition on discrimination, are necessarily hampered by the
qualifications allowing states discretionary perspective. Most
notably, the substantial provisions in Article 4 are crippled to the
extent that a state is excused from its duty where it finds the
minority interest to collide with a national or international
standard. 1° The ID, predictably, takes these provisions to the next
level. Article 12 provides:
204 id. at 108.
205 Id.
206 MD, supra note 160, art. 1.
207 ICCPR, supra note 48, art. 27.
208 MD, supra note 160, art. 2.
209 Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
210 Id.
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Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to
maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and
historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and
visual and performing arts and literature, as well as the right to
the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual
property taken without their free and informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.
21
'
Article 13 provides similarly extensive protections for religious
212rights, as does Article 14 for linguistic rights. Further, these
provisions make no reference for the rights of states to derogate in
the face of countervailing national legislation or international
213standards. The duties on states are referenced instead as
214measures to be taken in ensuring that these rights are protected.
d. Education and Labor
Article 4(4) of the MD provides that states, "where
appropriate, should take measures in the field of education, in
order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language
and culture of the minorities existing within their territories.
Again, without qualification, Part III of the ID mandates a number
of substantive rights to education.216 They include the rights of
children to all levels of state education, indigenous control over
their own autonomous educational systems, and the right to have
indigenous culture and history represented in public education.217
Part III also includes rights to indigenous ownership over media
outlets and the enjoyment of all rights under international labor
law.218 The MD does not cover these subjects.
e. Participatory and Economic Rights
Article 2(2) of the MD guarantees the right of minority persons
211 ID, supra note 192, at 109.
212 Id.
213 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 109-10.
214 Id.
215 MD, supra note 160, art. 4 (emphasis added).
216 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 109-10.
217 ID, supra note 192, at 109-10.
218 Id.
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to participate in public life,219 and Article 2(3) provides that such
people have the right to "participate effectively in decisions
on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning
the minority to which they belong 2 . . in a manner not
incompatible with national legislation." 2 0 The ID has similar
language protecting the rights of indigenous people to participate
effectively in the governance structure of the state to which they
belong.221 Article 19 provides for indigenous peoples to have the
right to participate fully in "all levels of decision-making in
matters which may affect their rights . . . .222 Article 20
supplements this right by guaranteeing the right to participate in
matters of the state that may affect indigenous interests through
indigenous procedures. However, the rest of Article 19 protects
the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain and develop their own
indigenous decision-making institutions, working in tandem with
224their capacity for public participation.
Both Declarations also speak to economic participation in
addition to democratic decision-making. The MD is limited to
Article 4(5), which shoulders states with the responsibility of
considering "appropriate measures so that persons belonging to
minorities may participate fully in the economic progress and
development in their country." 225 In contrast, Article 21 of the ID
discusses the right of indigenous peoples to maintain and develop
their own social and economic systems, and entitles people who
have in the past been deprived of their means of subsistence "to
just and fair compensation. 226  In terms of participation in the
economic life of the state, Article 22 provides for the right to
"special measures for the immediate, effective and continuing
improvement of their economic and social conditions, including
areas of employment, vocational training and retraining, housing,
219 MD, supra note 160, art. 2.
220 Id. (emphasis added).
221 Id.
222 ID, supra note 192, at 110.
223 Id.
224 Id.; see also MINORITIES AND THEIR RIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (Frank
Horn ed., 1996) (providing thorough treatment of the question of minority rights to
political participation).
225 MD, supra note 160, art. 4 (emphasis added).
226 ID, supra note 192, at I11.
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sanitation, health and social security. ' '227  Additionally, the ID
provides for the so-called third generational right of
development 2 28 in Article 23: "indigenous peoples have the right
to determine and develop all ...economic and social programs
affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programs
through their own institutions.,
229
f Land and Resource Rights
Control over territory is clearly a sensitive issue and one close
to the heart of sovereign authority. 230 It is not surprising, as such,
that there is no mention of a right to land in the MD. In the ID,
land rights play a substantial role, as evidenced in Articles 25-30.
Article 25 begins by guaranteeing indigenous peoples "the right to
maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material
relationship with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas...
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used
....,231 Article 26 provides for the right to develop, control, and
use the total environment of the "lands, air, waters, coastal seas,
sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources," which includes the
"right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions, and customs,
land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and
management of resources . ... ,232 Article 27's ambit is
compensatory, providing for the "restitution of all . . lands,
territories, and resources confiscated, occupied, used or damaged.
.. ,233 Article 28 provides for the conservation and restoration of
"the total environment and the productive capacity of their lands,
territories and resources. '  It also prohibits military activity,
unless freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, and bars the
storage of hazardous materials. 235 Article 30 provides a catch-all
227 Id.
228 See Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and
Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137 (2004); Anne Orford, Globalization and the "Right
to Development," in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 127 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
229 ID, supra note 192, at 111.
230 See ANAYA, supra note 55, at 104-06.
231 ID, supra note 192, at 111.
232 Id. at 111-12.
233 Id. at 112.
234 Id.
235 Id.
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provision:
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
priorities and strategies for the development or use of their
lands, territories and other resources, including the right to
require that States obtain their free and informed consent prior to
the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories, and
other resources, particularly in connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water and other resources.
Pursuant to agreement with the indigenous peoples concerned,
just and fair compensation shall be provided for any such
activities and measures taken to mitigate adverse environmental,
economic, social, cultural, or spiritual impact.
236
III.Federal American Indian Law: A Survey
237
With this in mind, we return to to come back to Huntington's
call for a resurgence of Anglo-Protestantism in the face of
America's national identity crisis, and ask whether any one of the
three liberal nation-building models appear to have a command on
the principles and practice shaping the development of the
American nation. Does federal jurisprudence in the United States
track assimilative tendencies toward whiteness? Is it colored more
extensively by documents like the U.N. declarations?
In previous sections this article has examined the theoretical
parameters of three models of political community in liberal
political theory and international law. After suggesting three types
of alliances-(l) charter liberalism and assimilationism, (2) liberal
anti-pluralism and liberal nationalism, and (3) multiculturalism
and international group norms-it went on to elaborate the history
and extent of the third alliance in greater detail. This extensive
236 ID, supra note 192, at 112-13.
237 International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1751, 1752 (2003). A glance at some relevant pieces of federal legislation
includes: Protections and Preservation of Traditional Religions of Native Americans, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1996 (2003); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25
U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013 (2003); Native American Language Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-
2906 (2003); Indian Education Program, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2651 (2003) (§§2601-
2606, 2621-2624, 25311, 2641-2643, 2651 repealed 1994); The Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (2003); Indian Land Consolidation Act,
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2211 (2003); National Indian Forest Resources Management Act,
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3120 (2003); Development of Tribal Mineral Resources, 25
U.S.C.A §§ 2101-2018 (2003).
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discussion of group rights in international law was important for
two reasons. First, the multicultural model is a late-comer in
international law, only recently finding success within the
classically individualistic framework of human rights law.
Second, international law appears to receive the greatest amount of
attention when performing in its multicultural guise. Together,
these points suggest multiculturalism-in theory and international
law-to be contemporary in a manner unlike its rivals.
Considering the breadth of these questions, this Part focuses on
a single ethnic group and its identity claim-Native American
Indians. Many writers invoke the idea of the miner's canary to
illustrate the problem often faced by marginalized populations in
238liberal societies. Likening Indians in America to Jews in
Germany, Felix Cohen wrote: "Like the miner's canary, the Indian
marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political
atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our
treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our
democratic faith.' 239 In the mines, workers sometimes brought
canaries to serve as warning signs, since the canaries often died
from exposure that would ultimately prove dangerous to the
miners. Due to their more vulnerable position, the canary
succumbed to agents that would prove dangerous to all involved.
It is in this light that groups like the American Indians and
African-Americans have been likened to the miner's canary;
socially corrosive consequences will be detected first in the
marginal populations.
If we are seeking guideposts in the search for national identity
in the United States, and the assumption is to initially direct
attention to the outskirts, we will quickly find American Indians.
To be sure, the stakes American Indians have in the national
identity debate should not be necessarily any more important than
any other marginalized group. Unlike any other ethno-cultural
group, however, Indians make an indigenous claim on the land
itself. Indians have been the recipients of a heritage of bizarre
238 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); Steven Paul McSloy, The "Miner's
Canary:" A Bird's Eye View of American Indian Law and its Future, 37 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 733 (2003).
239 Felix Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53: A Case Study in
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
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attempts240 by the U.S. government at situating this claim in the
landscape of American federalism. The Constitution sets out a
relatively clear relationship between the sovereign powers of the
several states and those of the federal government. It does not
speak to tribal powers, and from the moment the Supreme Court
originally identified American Indians as having dependent
sovereign status, the federal nature of American identity that
would develop in the next two centuries would not include Indians
in a coherent way. Perhaps, in the terms of culinary metaphors,
American Indians were initially viewed as a garnish-like
parsley-conveniently set beside the tomato soup.
A. The Marshall Trilogy and Foundational Principles
Pre-revolutionary colonial relationships between the white
Europeans and the American Indians on the American continent
were initially established by various treaties. 24  Not every Indian
tribe made a treaty with the nascent American government, but
many did. The United States allowed Indian tribes relative degrees
of autonomy and self-government to the extent these treaties were
capable of creating real and binding legal relationships. 242 After the
revolution, the framers of the Constitution took up the Indian
question in a cryptic reference in the Commerce Clause, which
provides Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
,243
Tribes." The intent and meaning of this reference has been
widely debated; 244 on its face, the Commerce Clause clearly
distinguishes the Indian tribes from states and foreign nations.
Whatever type of self-government or autonomous control
Congress intended for American Indians, the text admits that it
was not meant to be akin to either the relationship between state
240 Phillip Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997) ("If the 'life of the law' for
legal formalists is logic and for legal pragmatists is experience, then federal Indian law is
for neither.").
241 DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 83 (1993).
242 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, para. 3.
243 Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1984).
244 See Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional
Crisis Developing in Indian Law? A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 273-74
(2003).
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and federal government or the relationship between co-equal
sovereign nations.245
The bedrock legal principles developed in order to tease out
the constitutional structure of Indian governance were provided in
the well-known Marshall "trilogy., 246 The trilogy consists of three
Supreme Court cases all decided by Chief Justice William
Marshall between 1823 and 1832 based on juridical explorations
conducted entirely beyond the text of the Constitution. 247  Of
course, it is difficult to imagine what else the Court could have
done considering the paucity of constitutional text on the subject.
The first of the trilogy cases was Johnson v. M'Intosh,2 48
which involved the question of whether land-transfers between
Indians and non-Indians before the Revolution were legally
valid.249 After the Revolutionary War, many Indian lands that had
been purchased by officers came to the U.S. government, which
subsequently sold portions of these lands to private parties.25 ° The
plaintiff in M'Intosh was a successor to one of the original non-
Indian owners who was contesting the post-revolutionary sale.25'
The question for the Court was therefore whether the Indian tribes
had a retained sovereign right to these lands, or if by the so-called
doctrine of "discovery" the United States had commandeered full
legal control 2
As some commentators have suggested, Chief Justice Marshall
took a middle road through these "extremes. '' 253  Marshall
explained that it was impossible for Indian tribes to have retained a
full sovereign power, including the "power to dispose of the soil at
their own will,"254 because it was "necessarily diminished . . . by
the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive
245 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18
(1831): "In this clause they are clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to
themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several states composing the Union." Id.
246 For discussion, see Newton, supra note 243, at 200-05.
247 Pommersheim, supra note 244, at 275.
248 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
249 Id. at 571-72.
250 Id. at 560-61.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 572-74.
253 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 39-41 (1987).
254 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
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title to those who made it.' ' 255 Perhaps peculiar to the modem
disposition, this fundamental principle was justified, at least by the
English Crown, on the basis that all heathen societies were subject
to discovery and dominion by the Christian people.256  Chief
Justice Marshall then asked to what extent this principle had been
Unitd Sttes 257adopted in the United States. Answering in the affirmative, he
emphasized that "[t]he United States, then, have unequivocally
acceded to that great and broad rule by which its civilized
inhabitants now hold this country . . . . They maintain, as all
others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest ... ,258 The Court held that the plaintiffs could not
possess legal title to lands sold to them by Indians, because
Indians had not had the authority to make such a sale after the
ascension of American holdings.
The compromise, as it were, was that because the Court had
recognized an original tribal right to possession prior to the
"discovery," an inherent or latent sovereign residue was left
behind in the decision's wake.260 Conceivably, the Court could
have simply said that discovery had erased all sense of Indian title,
but as Justice Marshall said, Indian tribes retain a "right of
occupancy. ' 261 "Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as
occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the
possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others. ' 262  Explaining this
decision further, Charles Wilkinson has written:
This right of occupancy, a unique real property interest
previously recognized in the New World by Great Britain and
tracing to the writings of sixteenth-century philosophers, is a
compromise between tribal rights and prerogatives of the
discovering nations. The Indian right of occupancy is well short
of fee ownership-it can, for example, be extinguished by the
255 Id.
256 Id. at 576.
257 Id. at 584-87.
258 Id. at 587
259 Johnson, at 604-05.
260 Id. at 588.
261 Id.
262 ld. at 591.
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United States without compensation. On the other hand, original
Indian title is a valid interest in land under American real
property law, good against all but the federal government,
allowing the tribes to reside on their lands and to exclude
outsiders.
263
Chief Justice Marshall returned to the development of Indian
autonomy in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.264 The case involved a
contest between the state of Georgia and the Cherokee over the use
and control of certain lands previously occupied by the Cherokee.
265
The Court began with an examination of its jurisdiction over the
Cherokee, as to whether the Cherokee are to be treated as a sovereign
foreign nation, or as a state of the Republic, or as something else
altogether.266 Chief Justice Marshall explained at the threshold
that "the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by
peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist no where else.
' 2 67
This unique relationship is that of a "domestic dependent
nation, ' 2V occupying a territory whose title to which is owned by
the United States independently of tribal will, and resembling "that
of a ward to his guardian." 269 The Court explained,
[Indians and Indian territory] are considered by foreign nations.
. as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of
the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to
form a political connexion (sic) with them, would be considered
by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.270
As such, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that there was a
lack of jurisdiction over the Cherokee nation since it was not
capable of being identified as one of the Court's subjects in Article
III of the Constitution.27 1
Having ducked the issue in Cherokee Nation, the problem of
Indian-state relations returned the following year in Worcester v.
263 WILKINSON, supra note 253, at 39-41.
264 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
265 Id. at 2-3.
266 Id. at 16.
267 Id. at 16.
268 Id. at 17.
269 See Cherokee Nation at 17.
270 See id.
271 Id. at 20.
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Georgia.2 72  The Georgia legislature had promulgated a rule
barring non-Indians from residing in Cherokee territory without a
license from the governor.273 Some missionaries from Vermont
were found living among the Cherokee without having acquired a
license,274 and they were convicted and sentenced to four years of
hard labor. 275 The question that came before the Supreme Court
was whether Georgia had the authority to govern activity within
the Cherokee territory.
276
Drawing on the Treaty of Hopewell established in 1785, the
Court construed the language and intent of this congressional act
to have not been a receipt of a surrender of self-government on the
part of the Indian tribes.2 77 Rather, "its essential articles treat the
Cherokees as a nation capable of maintaining the relations of
peace and war; and ascertain the boundaries between them and the
,,278United States. The sum of treaties, the Court emphasized, treat
Indians as "nations... [and] distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which
is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States." 279
Invoking the constitutional imprimatur of treaty-as-law, the Court
subsequently held the state of Georgia to have no authority over
the Indian tribes "retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil ... with the single exception of
that imposed by [the doctrine of discovery] .,,280 The states, Chief
Justice Marshall concluded, were to have no control over Indian
tribes.
2 8 1
272 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
273 Id. at 523.
274 Id. at 529
275 Id. at 532.
276 Id. at 541.
277 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553-54.
278 Id. at 554.
279 Id. at 557.
280 Id. at 559.
281 Id. at 561-62. There was heavy fall-out after this decision, with Georgia refusing
to obey the order. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics,
and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525-26 (1969); HORACE GREELEY, AMERICAN
CONFLICT VOL. 1 106 (1864).
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B. Reversal and Renewal in Federal Indian Legislation:
1776-1975
As far as the judicial approach to federal Indian policy went,
the Marshall trilogy, for more than a hundred years, appeared to be
a fair compass for the Court. The trilogy generally interpreted
ambiguous treaties in favor of American Indians and protecting
Worcester-type claims to self-government, 282 yet retained a
general plenary power on the part of Congress, exclusive to the
rights of states. 283  Legislatively, the approach has had its own
twists and turns. The period from the beginning of the Republic
through the end of the nineteenth century, covering the time in
which the Marshall trilogy was decided, is sometimes called the
"formative period. 284
As referenced in Worcester, the Framers' initial Indian policy
was an artifact of British negotiations with tribal authorities.
285
After the Revolution, these agreements lost their legal force, but
George Washington was quick to draw on the past in what became
known as the "Savage as the Wolf' policy.286 As Washington was
acquainted with the ferocity of Indian resolve when faced with
colonial pressure, war with the Indians was the last concern of the
new Republic. Thus, during his presidency, Washington urged a
conciliatory approach balancing the self-management of tribal
activities with the ultimate authority and power of the federal
government. 287 Moreover, it was important to facilitate a pathway
288towards an open and sustainable trade network. Professor
Francis Prucha suggested the following benchmarks from the
formative years in legislative policy: (1) the settling of definite
boundaries for Indian country; 289 (2) the denial of acquisition of
Indian land by agents other than the Unites States government; (3)
282 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267, 267 (2001).
283 GETCHES, supra note 241, at 84.
284 Id. at 83-165.
285 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 517.
286 GETCHES, supra note 241, at 95.
287 Id.
288 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS:
THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS 1-3, 43-50 (1962).
289 Indian Removal Act of 1830, 25 U.S.C. § 174 (2000) (outlining the U.S. policy
for forcible relocation of Native Americans).
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the regulation of trade; (4) the control of traffic in alcohol; (5) the
regulation of crimes conspiring between races; and (6) the
promotion of civilization among the Indians.
290
In 1887, the Dawes Act, also known as the General Allotment
Act, was passed by Congress.29' Throughout the latter half of the
nineteenth century, Americans were becoming increasingly
avaricious in their interests for Indian land, and Congress was not
deaf to these interests.292 Indeed, the tumult in the wake of
Worcester was illustrative of the escalating feelings on the part of
white Americans that they had rights to Indian land. The Dawes
Act promulgated the notion of allotment, that is, the
disaggregation of tribal lands to the possession of individual tribal
293members. The point was that by breaking up large tribal
holdings, large sections of land became available for non-Indian
settlement, thus paving the way towards greater individual
ownership and away from traditional communal holdings.294 In
hopes of further integrating Indians into American society while at
the same time shifting tribal lands into non-Indian hands, the
program's parceling of individual land-plots among tribal
members resulted in large chunks of land being opened to non-
295Indian homesteading.
The legitimacy of the Dawes Act was questioned in the
296Supreme Court in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, decided in 1903.
The Indian position relied on a treaty signed in 1868 between the
Kiowa and Comanche tribes and the federal government
prohibiting the cession of tribal lands unless approved by three-
fourths of all adult male tribal members. 297  The question ofwhether this treaty provision held sway in the face of subsequent
290 Id.
291 Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)).
292 GETCHES, supra note 241, at 190-91.
293 See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999); Judith
V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
294 Delos Sacket Otis, History of the Allotment Policy on H.R. 7902 Before the
House Committee on Indian Affairs - 73rd Cong. 2d Sess., § 9, at 428-29 (1934).
295 Frickey, supra note 293, at 14-15.
296 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
297 Id. at 564.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
congressional decisions was not one for the Court: "[p]lenary
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised
by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of government."
298
The Court's permissive attitude with respect to allotment and
assimilation had taken a serious toll on the Indian lands and
communities from the end of the nineteenth and into the
beginnings of the twentienth century. 299 Inspired by a new vision
with respect to reforming federal Indian policy, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) promulgated the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) of 1934.300 The IRA was based on a rationale aimed at
reversing the effects of allotment policies, and brought to an end
the doctrine of allotment and refurbishing tribal control over
Indian lands. 3° 1 Hot on the heels of the IRA was the publication
by the Department of Interior of Felix Cohen's well-known
Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 302 The text, in tandem with the
BIA, represented a return to Worcester-like protections for Indian
self-government and the re-establishment of the principle that
Indian powers were not delegated from Congress, but residual
sovereign rights pre-existing the coming of the American colonial
project.303
Turning on a dime, however, was yet another reversal in policy
304with a change in administrative leadership at the BIA. Congress
developed what became known as its termination policy to
encompass "complete integration" and assimilation. 3 5  This
policy, originating with a House of Representatives resolution in
1953, asked for nothing less than all "Indian tribes and individual
members thereof, should be freed from Federal supervision and
control and from all disabilities and limitations specially
298 Id. at 565.
299 MERIAM REPORT, INSTITUTE FOR GOVT. RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION,
THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928).
300 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
301 For discussion, see Newton, supra note 243, at 272-73.
302 FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2d ed. 1982).
303 Id. at 122-23.
304 See Getches, supra note 282, at 231.
305 Id. at 229-48.
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applicable to Indians. ' 3°6 A number of congressional acts were
subsequently promulgated, with the effect of 109 tribes being
terminated-or, in the parlance of the time-liberated from
federal restrictions deemed discriminatory against Indians. 307 Of
course, this extravagant attempt at Americanizing the Indians by
nullifying tribal structures had an explosive impact on Indian
communities, and, as is often the case with minority oppression,
30 8
federal termination policy had the effect of creating an invigorated
tribal rights movement. A progressive accumulation of protests,
public discontent, and discord ultimately resulted in the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of 1968310 and President Nixon's formal
reversal of the termination program in 1970.311
Nixon's declaration of a new federal policy on Indian
affairs centered on a right to "self-determination." The new
administration's goal would be to "strengthen the Indian's sense
of autonomy without threatening his sense of community .... [W]e
must make it clear that Indians can become independent of Federal
control without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal
support.' 312 The principal legislation following this presidential
declaration was the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975.313 In marked contrast from the termination
period, this legislation followed a philosophy of federally funded
programs planned and administered by the tribes themselves.31
4
The essence of the Act is in § 450(0, which provides that the
"Secretary [of Interior and Health and Human Services] is
directed, upon the request of any tribe by tribal resolution, to enter
into a self-determination contract or contracts with a tribal
306 See id. at 231.
307 CHARLES WILSK1NSON & ERIC BIGGS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERMINATION
POLICY 151-54 (1977).
308 See generally Justin Stein, Taking the Deliberative Turn in China: International
Law, Minority Rights, and the Case of Xinjiang, 14 J. PUB. AND INT'L AFF. 144 (2003);
Justin Stein, Rites and Rights: The Hazara and the 2004 Constitution, 29 THE FLETCHER
FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS (2005) (forthcoming).
309 STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 123-24 (1988).
310 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1303 (2003).
311 H.R. Doc No. 363, 91stCong., 2d Sess. (1970).
312 GETCHES, supra note 241, at 227 (quoting Richard Nixon).
313 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 450a-450n (2003) [hereinafter Self-Determination Act].
314 Getches, supra note 282, at 255.
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organization to plan, conduct, and administer programs or portions
thereof . . . for the benefit of Indians because of their status as
Indians ... ."315
C. Judicial Plenary Power in the Rehnquist Court
Ten years after Congress passed ICRA, the Supreme Court
took up the question of whether tribal authorities had criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe.3 16  From the perspective of classic
principles developed in the Marshall trilogy, intuitively a
presumption would work in favor of jurisdiction for the tribe so
long as Congress has not legislated otherwise. 317 Further, with the
addition of federal due process rules now applicable to the tribes
through ICRA, more weight would likely be given the tribes in
allowing jurisdictional authority. 31  This is not, however, how
Oliphant turned out. Beginning what David Getches has termed
the "subjectivist period" in federal Indian adjudication,319 the
Oliphant opinion, penned by Justice Rehnquist, held that Indian
tribal courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on
tribal lands. 32  The basic rationale for the Court was that, while it
was true that Indians continued to possess a residual, "quasi-
sovereign" authority, Indians could not claim a right to criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians without the express delegation of
such a power by Congress. 32 1  By recalling language from
Cherokee Nation and focusing on the issue, Rehnquist reminded
the tribes that they are precluded from powers not only as
expressly terminated by Congress, but also from those "inconsistent
with their status" as dependent sovereign nations.3 22  Criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, apparently divined by the Court
315 Self-Determination Act, supra note 313, § (a)(1).
316 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
317 Getches, supra note 282, at 267; Catherine Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard
Case Easy: Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 288, 291-95 (2003).
318 Frickey, supra note 293, at 35.
319 Getches, supra note 282, at 267.
320 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195.
321 GETCHES, supra note 241, at 409.
322 Id.
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without express reference, was one of those powers ceded away.
323
Until this point, the Court's tests for adjudicating the scope
of tribal authority had typically dealt with the expanse of a
given reservation's territory.32 4  That is to say, as a systemic
consequence of allotment policies, reservation populations became
far from homogenous, often with large segments of non-Indian
landholdings. 325 In such situations, the Court sought to protect the
"justifiable expectations" of non-Indians living on diminished
reservations. 32  As Professor Philip Frickey has discussed, "[t]he
problem was that in Oliphant there was no contention that the
reservation had been diminished; thus, the Court had to limit tribal
territorial sovereignty by limiting the sovereignty rather than the
territory." 327 Indeed, "for the first time in 150 years, the Court
took it upon itself to impose new limitations on tribal
sovereignty.
328
Why did the Court hold that the status of "dependent sovereign
nation" was inconsistent with the power to assert criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians when Congress had never made such
a declaration, and no treaty was cited as an authority? Rehnquist
explained that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians was an intrusion on personal liberty incompatible with the
purely internal power to regulate and "preserve their unique
customs and social order."329  This consent-based rationale
emerged again in a subsequent case, Duro v. Reina, that dealt with
the question of whether a tribe could assert criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians of the reservation.330 In Duro, the Court
explained that consent was the one central factor that legitimated
tribal criminal jurisdiction over anyone.331 Pitting this exercise of
criminal jurisdiction on individual consent highlighted the
mechanics at work in Oliphant. Adjudication of tribal claims was
323 See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 141-53 (1993).
324 Frickey, supra note 293, at 38.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 17-27.
327 Id. at 38.
328 Id. at 36.
329 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1990).
330 Id.
331 Id. at 693.
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not a contest between the rights of two sovereigns, but a balance of
the tribal interest against the civil liberties interest under the U.S.
Constitution.
332
The Duro and Oliphant opinions are notable in a number of
ways. For example, in neither decision did the holding turn on a
constitutional interpretation of congressional command, but instead
relied on juridical analysis of tribal sovereignty. 333 Certainly, the
Court draws on the constitution with respect to its goal of protecting
non-consenting individuals from tribal authority; but until
Oliphant, the test instead would have been to leave inherent tribal
powers undisturbed in the absence of congressional plenary power.
As Frickey suggested, "Duro does nothing to clarify either the
source or the scope of the ongoing judicial power, first recognized
in Oliphant, to truncate tribal sovereignty on a case-by-case basis
at the behest of non-members." 334 Predictably, the Duro decision
garnered an extreme reaction among the American Indian
community, motivating a mobilization of lobbying efforts in
Congress to statutorily overrule Duro.335  These efforts were
successful in what became known as the "Duro override."
336
In the civil jurisdiction context, developments in the Rehnquist
Court have been equally hostile with respect to tribal sovereignty.
Montana v. United States337 involved the question of whether the
Crow tribe had the power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-
Indians within the boundaries of the Crow reservation.3 38 With
little hesitation, the Court first held that the rights to navigable
watercourses belonged to the states, and as such, was governed by
Montana.339 The narrower question was whether tribal authority
included the land rights of non-Indian fishing and hunting on
332 "Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to
subject American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide
constitutional protections as a matter of right." Id. at 693.
333 Getches, supra note 282, at 332-34; David Getches, Conquering the Cultural
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law 84 CAL. L. REV
1573, 1575 (1996).
334 Frickey, supra note 293, at 42.
335 See GETCHES, supra note 241, at 417.
336 Id.
337 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
338 Id. at 547.
339 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (4) (2003).
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portions of the reservation owned by non-members of the tribe.
340
Relying on United States v. Wheeler,34 1 the Court noted that the
inherent aspects of tribal sovereign powers had been degraded, and
that the present state of such tribal power could not go "beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations." 342 For the tribe to go beyond what is necessary
would contradict the fact that tribes were dependent on the express
343delegation of congressional authority. Concluding that non-
Indian hunting and fishing did not threaten the tribe's "political or
economic security," the Court held that such activities on the Crow
reservation were beyond the pale of tribal regulation. 344 Montana,
extending the analysis in Oliphant and Duro, reversed the
presumption in favor of tribal authority articulated in the Marshall
trilogy, opting instead for a burden on the tribe to prove that the
assertion of power was necessary to self-govern.
345
More recently, the Supreme Court has continued to confirm the
modem validity of the Montana rule without explicitly explaining
its relationship with classic Indian legal principles. These cases
have included decisions barring the exercise of tribal court
authority over claims against non-members on state easements,
346
barring tribal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction
over state officials when the activity in question was conducted on
reservation lands,347 and barring tribal authority to impose
occupancy taxes on hotel guests situated on fee land within the
reservation. 348 In each case, Justice Rehnquist's pronouncement in
Atkinson is illustrative of the Court's Oliphant/ Montana approach:
"[o]nly full territorial sovereigns enjoy the 'power to enforce laws
against all who come within ... [their] territory' . . . and Indian
340 Montana, 450 U.S. at 556.
341 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
342 Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 546.
345 Struve, supra note 317, at 293; see also County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 270-78 (1992) (J.
Blackmun, concurring and dissenting in part).
346 Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
347 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 353-54 (2001).
348 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,647 (2001).
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tribes 'can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense. ' 349
There is something extraordinary about this line of Supreme
Court decision-making, prompting scholars like Frank
Pommersheim to ask whether a constitutional crisis is developing
in Indian law. 350  In contrast to the well-established-and much
criticized-plenary power of Congress to legislate in areas
relatively free from judicial supervision, the claim is that the
Supreme Court itself, and in particular the Rehnquist Court,351 has
generated a judicial plenary power. 352 As Pommersheim explains,
the plenary power doctrine can now be seen as coming in two
distinct vintages. There is the classic doctrine of congressional
plenary power as established in Lone Wolf. Yet even if
Congress has not acted-where one would normally presuppose
an unimpaired tribal sovereignty-the Court now recognizes a
judicial plenary power to parse the limits of tribal court authority
based on federal common law.353
The status of this judicial power is ambivalent, however, as it
can be situated in a way quite easily consistent with the
fundamental role of judicial review. As the Eighth Circuit Court
Appeal held in United States v. Weaselhead, the relationship
between tribal sovereignty, state sovereignty, and federal
sovereignty is governed by the Constitution and as a matter of
course therefore falls to the Supreme Court, and not Congress, for
the last word.355 The trouble with this argument is the lack of
constitutional text on the subject. The Framers intended for
Congress to have the right to regulate Indian commerce, but
beyond this it is almost impossible to say as a textual matter. It is
an awkward argument at best to suggest that the Supreme Court
349 Id. at 653. For further discussion on Atkinson, see L. Scott Gould, Tough Love
for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 669
(2003) (enunciating a "constricting view of tribal sovereignty").
350 Pommersheim, supra note 244.
351 Professor Getches argues that "the Rehnquist Court seems oblivious to the
discrete body of Indian law that is based on solid judicial traditions tracing back to the
nation's founding." Getches, supra note 282, at 267.
352 See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary:
Opportunities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REv. 313,
328 (1997).
353 Id.
354 United States v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998).
355 Id. at 824.
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has final authority to decide Indian law because it is the Court's
role to explicate the meaning of the Constitution when there is
nothing in the Constitution to interpret.356 Congressional plenary
power does not necessarily follow either since the Constitution is
silent as well on the subject of whether Congress has a general
regulatory power over Indians. 357 Why has it taken over a century
for that constitutional silence to develop into what might be a
crisis? For 150 years, courts recognized a presumptive power in
favor of tribal authority anchored in Justice Marshall's canonical
decisions. Recently the Court has strayed quite dramatically from
course with little evidence of impetus other than "subjectivist"
trends towards states' rights and the emergence of a federal
common law in "our age of colonialism."
358
IV. Where Political Community and National Identity Part
Ways
A. Liberal American Indian Law: Feel the Ambivalence
As we have seen, there is considerable debate in the United
States over the future of its national identity, and as explained in
Part II, there are at least three views that advocate various forms of
assimilation, liberal nationalism, and multiculturalism. The
assimilative and multicultural views appear to have the strongest
connections with international norms, with their respective
rejections and invocations.359  On the other hand, liberal
nationalism seems to have the smallest use for international law in
its conceptualization of national identity, and yet has the strongest
link with developments in international legal theory. 360  The
upshot of this debate is that international legal norms play an
ambivalent role in the arguments advocates make for and against
356 The traditional juridical route in such circumstances is the invocation of a
political question doctrine or congressional plenary power. See Mark Tushnet, The
Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1203 (2002) (remarking that "today's court has no general constitutional theory that
cautions against invalidating statutes"); Martin Redish, Judicial Review and the Political
Question, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1301 (1984); Louis Henkin, Is There a Political Question
Doctrine? 85 YALE L. J. 597 (1976).
357 Newton, supra note 243, at 196.
358 Frickey, supra note 293, at 145.
359 See supra text accompanying notes 2-7.
360 See supra text accompanying notes 67-91.
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particular styles of nation-building. The assimilationist model is
supported by classic Charter liberalism, in which the nation and
state are quietly conflated; the liberal nationalist model is
supported by "the new liberals" in international law with their
focus on democratic states and individual rights; multiculturalists
find support in the recent wave of pan-indigenous solidarity and
U.N. Declarations on the rights of groups.
361
After having mapped this liberal ambivalence in international
law, Part III provided the example of American Indians to see
whether any of the three models was in fact tracked in the federal
law governing American Indians and their claims to indigenous
rights. The answer, predictably, is muddled. First, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence since Oliphant has generated a number of
attacks on tribal powers. 362 The tests for sovereign providence no
longer assume tribal authority where Congress has been silent but
instead ask whether the asserted right is a necessary quality of self-
government. 363 Considering the legal absence of criteria guiding
the boundaries of self-governance, this test should not be
necessarily pro- or anti-tribal. However, in effect, the "subjectivist
turn" has been decidedly restrictive. The result is that in the
twenty-first century juridical landscape, American Indians have far
less collective power than they have ever had before. This
consequence is consonant with Huntington's thesis that national
identity requires exclusive membership inasmuch as outlying
cultural populations must face a choice between assimilation and
marginalization. 364 It is also consistent with Charter liberalism to
the extent that the reduction of sub-national powers instantiates the
authority of the single state, or rather, the single nation-state.
Second, liberal nationalism makes sense in the American
Indian legal framework due to its emphasis on consent-theories of
governance. Part of the rationale the Court has provided in its
restrictions of tribal powers has been based on democratic ideas
about self-government. 365 Individuals on the reservation that are
either non-Indian or non-members of the tribe and have not
361 See Wilmer, supra note 186; supra text accompanying notes 181-222.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 296-338.
363 See Montana, 450 U.S at 564.
364 See supra text accompanying notes 48-65.
365 See Montana, 450 U.S. at 559, 564.
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consented to Indian governance should not be subject to such
governance. 366  The rights of individuals to democratically
participate in the deliberative process of governance are rights that
must trump the rights of groups. In the field of liberal nationalism
a hierarchy of rights is not especially problematic since the
fundamental rights are those belonging to individuals, and the
fundamental features of national identities necessary for
democratic solidarity dominate group interests. Liberal
nationalism guarantees respect for cultural identities and seeks
means of establishing their respective autonomies through the
deliberative process. In this light, legislation focused on tribal
autonomy is viewed as a favorable development, maintaining a
pluralistic respect for the facts of multicultural life. This respect,
however, is appropriately chastened by the Supreme Court's
preference for individual rights to democratic governance.
367
Third, American Indian law is multicultural, at least to a
degree. In the history of congressional perspectives on Indian
rights, the present view is a generous one. 68 Despite legislation
that devolved authority to the tribes, this situation is nonetheless a
weak signal for multicultural progress in at least two ways. The
first is that congressional acts providing special powers to
Indian communities are evidence of a move with explicitly non-
sovereign dimensions. That is, there has been a long history
in Indian jurisprudence between congressional delegations to
tribes of certain powers, and congressional recognition that tribes
have inherent powers. 369 In the contemporary climate, it is very
difficult to understand legislation as recognizing inherent tribal
sovereign powers. The fact that tribes lobby for autonomous
control is indicative of the Court's hostility to powers conflicting
with individual rights and federalism, with the result being
366 See id. at 559.
367 See Duro, 495 U.S. at 676 (noting that "tribal courts embody only the powers of
internal self-governance").
368 See, e.g., Marcia Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory
Responses to American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L. J. 1623
(2004) (discussing positive developments in federal regulation in the context of
indigenous land use); Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the
Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law
and Policy, 4 NEV. L. J. 262 (2003) (discussing increased Indian power in the context of
gambling).
369 See supra text accompanying notes 227-261.
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congressional action in favor of protecting the tribes from judicial
assault. This is not recognition-it is Congress delegating
authority that may be exercised by tribes, so long as such exercise
is consistent with overriding federal norms. This delegative
quality suggests a second obstacle for multicultural progress,
and this concerns the tracking between United States Indian
legislation and the U.N. Declaration on Minority Rights, as
opposed to the Declaration on Indigenous Rights. 370 The Minority
Rights Declaration is individualistic and heavily crippled
by qualifications in public policy considerations. 37  If the
multicultural premise is to reverse the conventional presumption
that the burden is on sub-national groups to argue for preferential
treatment, and instead place group rights as the starting point in the
anti-assimilationist analysis, American Indian law is not doing this
premise justice.
B. Problems with Assimilation and Liberal Nationalism
John Stuart Mill wrote in his Considerations on Representative
Government that national solidarity is important for the collective
action necessary in a democratic society. 372  John Rawls also
mentioned the advantages of national identity or at least the
advantages of the state as playing the vehicle for democratic
membership.373 The fact of the matter is that liberal political
theory never developed a comprehensive theory on to whom
liberal obligations are owed.3 7 4 In a liberal society, it is clear how
individuals are expected to behave with respect to equality, liberty,
and deliberation. What has always been less than clear is the
question of where "liberal society" ends. In the twentieth century,
liberal society was understood to be a measure of the state, and to
the extent liberalism's discussion of political community dealt
370 This is simply to say that when American law conceives group rights at all, it
will be in the more individualistic, collective vein as opposed to the corporate vein. See
Robert L. Simon, Pluralism and Equality: The Status of Minority Values in a
Democracy, in MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 207, 210-15 (John W. Chapman & Alan
Wertheimer eds., 1990).
371 See supra text accompanying notes 181-222.
372 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 546 (J.
M. Robson ed., 1977).
373 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (1999).
374 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 261-68, 312-14.
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with the obligations owed between human beings, these
obligations were unpacked as relationships between governments
and its citizens. 375 This transition from person to citizen was made
inconsequentially, and it has only been in the last decades that the
national assumption in liberal theory has been seriously
contested.376
The first two models of political community-assimilation and
liberal nationalism-accept and defend this assumption that the
transition from liberal demands on humans to liberal obligations to
fellow-citizens is a necessary one. 377 Beset by cosmopolitan and
multicultural critiques on the liberal construction of identity, the
passive Charter conflation of the nation/state and citizen/person
required a legitimately justifiable base, and the question is whether
the assimilation and liberal nationalist models have done the job.
Arash Abizadeh has recently set out a series of critiques against
the liberal nationalist emphasis on the relationship between
national identities and liberal democracies. 378 Among them is the
use of myth as a narrative tool for justifying the legitimacy of so-
called authentic nationalities over abstracted ones.379 Common to
nationalism studies is the idea of myth, popularly articulated by
Benedict Anderson with his notion of the imagined community: in
societies where it will be impossible for an individual to ever
know most of his fellow-members, the viability of an over-arching
national identity depends on the extent to which people imagine
themselves as members of a coherent community. 3 ° As Professor
Abizedeh points out the use of myth in nationalist movements
comes in at least two flavors: myth-as-history and myth-as-
story. 38
1
Samuel Huntington's tomato soup theory is an example of
nation-building by way of myth-as-history. Recalling Anderson's
375 See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
376 KYMLICKA, supra note 9, at 261-68, 312-14.
377 See supra text accompanying notes 28-91.
378 See Arash Abizadeh, Historical Truth, National Myths, and Liberal Democracy,
12 J. POL. PHIL. 291 (2004), Arash Abizadeh, Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a
Liberal Nation? Four Arguments, 96 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 495 (2002)
[hereinafter Historical Truth].
379 Historical Truth, supra note 378.
380 BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (1983).
381 Historical Truth, supra note 378, at 297.
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concept of the imagined community, Huntington explains that
what is not as important as imagining the community is
remembering it. "No nation exists in the absence of national
history, enshrining in the minds of its people common memories
of their travails and triumphs, heroes and villains, enemies and
wars, defeats and victories." 382 The nation is therefore dependent
on literal interpretations of a common history that binds its
members together; real history and real events are what provide
social integration-not myths and stories.383  This historical
account is essential for Huntington considering his perspective on
liberalism's heritage. As in the American Creed, the basic tenets
of liberal democracy only exist because a particular group of
people acted at a particular time: the settling of North America by
Anglo-Protestants. 384  These were people that had a unique
understanding of free and equal governance and its relation to
Christian convictions, the English language, and British law.
385
The civic and the ethnic cannot be distinguished here, as it is
literally at the ethno-cultural core of the settlers that birthed the
civic.
Huntington's thesis is laudable for the fact that it admits liberal
democracy's inherent tendencies to assimilate marginalized
populations. 386 Liberal democracy is not neutral with respect to
cultural goods. It is, in fact, a cultural good in its own right:
"Throughout American history, people who were not white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants have become Americans by adopting America's
Anglo-Protestant culture and political values. While its
forthrightness is commendable, tomato soup cannot actually
withstand the application of liberal principles, at least in terms of
its political philosophy. On its face, liberal democracy requires a
society in which individuals are at liberty to equally contest
distributions of power through the various mechanics of
deliberation, association, and participation. This deliberation, for
liberal democracy to be justifiable in terms of its own principles,
must be more than chimerical: it must have the generative power
382 HUNTINGTON, supra note 1, at 116.
383 See id.
384 Id. at 37.
385 Id. at 38.
386 Id. at 41.
387 Id. at 61.
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of self-determination.
A liberal democracy that takes a programmatic approach
towards assimilating cultural populations not part of the "core"
may be a functional bi-product of having fused nations with states,
but it is simply oxymoronic to justify the destruction of particular
world-views, moral conceptions, and cultural identities with the
vocabulary of liberalism. If the fundamental imperative in a
liberal democracy is to provide space for individuals to write their
own "life-stories," how is it possible for liberalism to normatively
prescribe the instruction of one, single life-story, the one created
by seventeenth century Anglo-Protestants? The answer is that it
cannot.
This normative problem implicates an empirical one, which
comes back to the critique of myth-as-history. Recalling
Huntington's emphasis on remembering history, contrast this with
Ernest Renan's take on the role of memory in nation-building:
"Forgetting, and I would say even historical error, are an essential
factor in the creation of a nation . . . .388 Further, the point for
Anderson was not simply that communities had to be imagined
because memberships had grown too large, but they had to be
imagined because the forging ideas in nation-building would
invariably be fabricated.389 Taking a less pejorative spin on the
process, Anderson argued that these fabrications instead be
understood as creation myths, imagined as a means for bringing
people together. 390  Outside of the nationalist literature which
essentially laughs at the academic use of literal historical
interpretation as a basis for national identity, 391 the liberal focus on
deliberation and speaking "truth to power" calls into question the
viability of Huntington's wildly one-sided telling of the American
tale. Because Huntington is explicitly using a literal use of history
as a basis for nation-building, his thesis is subject to "the criterion
of truth' 392 in historical analysis. As the scholarship demonstrates,
Huntington's story turns out to be, well, a myth.
393
388 Historical Truth, supra note 378, at 292 (translating Renan).
389 See ANDERSON, supra note 380, at 6.
390 Id.
391 See Historical Truth, supra note 378, at 293.
392 Id.
393 Morton Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
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What about liberal nationalism and its prescriptive vision for
political community? Is its model more normatively attractive, at
least on liberal principles, for groups like American Indians? As
discussed earlier, David Miller's version of the liberal nationalist
thesis is that liberal principles can be reconciled with nation-
building in a way that steers clear of the troubles inevitably due a
program that highlights the generative role of a specific ethno-
cultural core. 394 One way Miller attempts to find the right mix of
political pluralism and social integration is through the use of
myth-as-story. Like Anderson and unlike Huntington, Miller does
not believe in academically verifiable accounts of national history
that can serve to bind its members in a socially integrated way.
39 5
The point for Miller is therefore a functional one: if myths are
necessary for democratic solidarity, and since it appears that they
are, it is important to temper these myths with the principles of
396liberal democracies. Invoking the image of deliberative
democracy, Miller hopes that in the public sphere individuals and
groups can freely and equally debate the terms of their
governance, with the eventual product of a multi-colored national
democracy. 397 As Abizadeh argues, however, this hope faces a
serious problem in its juxtaposition of myths-as-stories (histories
recognized for their functional value over their claims to accuracy)
and a discursive politics that has, as its purpose, the production of
justifiable decision-making. 398
Imagine as an example of the problem a hypothetical forum in
which several groups debate the advantages of implementing
multi-lingual forms of primary education. Say that one of these
groups argues against this reform because one of the premises of
social integration is the common knowledge of a particular
language. To the extent that English is reduced to only one of
many languages children learn, English will lose its dominance
and function as a common currency. An assumption in this
argument is that Americans have always accepted the functional
394 See supra text accompanying notes 80-91.
395 Miller writes: "It is precisely because of the mythical or imaginary elements in
national identity that it can be reshaped to meet new challenges and new needs."
MILLER, supra note 23, at 32.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 5.
398 Historical Truth, supra note 378, at 293.
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advantages of having a common language, and it would therefore
be inconsistent with this heritage to devalue the power of having
an official language. Whether this argument has merit is irrelevant
here; the point is that on Miller's view, it would not matter if the
argument is entirely fallacious as a matter of making a historical
claim if the actual rationale about language and social integration
holds water.
It might be objected at this point that Miller is right to say that
historical accuracy is irrelevant, since the issue is not whether
multilingual education has been historically unacceptable, but
rather if it would pose a real problem for social integration in
practice. The problem with this objection is that it has lost focus.
The example of the debate on education is not a means of simply
illustrating how deliberation works; it is supposed to be an
example of how sub-national groups will be able to meaningfully
shape national identities through the deliberative process. History
is important to the discussion, since the claim about hostility
towards multilingual education is a claim implicating the national
creation story. If sub-national groups are unable to contest the
historical accuracies of national myths because these myths are
valuable for their function, and not for their history, Miller's
deliberative focus becomes a non-starter. As Abizadeh asserts:
"The philosophical problem should be clear: if social integration is
to be secured via a collective identity that is in part premised on
lies, then to the extent that liberal democracy implies norms of
public justification, publicity, and meaningful consent, social
integration appears to be incompatible with liberal democracy."
399
If the assimilation model can be dismissed for its facially
illiberal implications, and the liberal nationalist model is at least
questionable for not having articulated a workable means for
guaranteeing sub-national influence on the construction of national
identity, is the multicultural model the last framework standing?
To be sure, there are a number of hurdles the multicultural model
still needs to confront, including: (1) the status quo power
structure of individualism and statism; (2) the threat of
balkanization; (3) liberal democratic society's requirement of a
common identity strong enough for non-strategic social
integration; and (4) the social justice argument against
399 Id.
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cosmopolitan political community. Cosmopolitan citizenship is a
luxury enjoyed by elites, and to the extent Americans reach
upwards and outwards in their identitarian commitments, the
marginalized will necessarily be left behind. At the very least,
however, multiculturalism appears-at present-to be the most
equitably situated for dealing with the needs of embedded
identities, whether majoritarian white or disempowered American
Indian. In this light at least, multiculturalism does not look too
bad.
V. Conclusion
There is a gap in how liberal theory comprehends the
boundaries of political association and democratic community.
While clear on the rights and duties liberal individuals should
expect from one another, much of the literature makes a relatively
quiet transition to discussions of citizens and states. This
transition had been largely undefended up until the late twentieth
century, when the twin forces of multiculturalism and
globalization placed new strains on the Westphalian system. In
the course of such arguments, as articulated in various forms of
assimilationism and liberal nationalism, the nation-state ideal was
defended on normative and empirical grounds. Not only was this
the best way of shaping a political community due to the positive
identitarian benefits of coherent national communities, the state
system is the most functional structure for realizing the
aspirational efforts of the national community.
These assimilative and liberal nationalist projects have
counterparts in international law, as described by Simpson in his
story of the Two Liberalisms. However, what Simpson left out is
the competing story of multiculturalism, both within liberal
political theory and in international law. A third layer is therefore
the multicultural component, and as illustrated in the United States
with the case of American Indians, all three variants appear to be
working side by side, effecting one giant muddle of nation-
building. There are normative difficulties with the assimilative
and liberal nationalist projects, to the extent that they either rely on
fallacious historical accounts, or procedural mechanisms enlisted
to overcome such lies, but end up leaving their hortatory powers in
place.
Eliminating the two dominant players leaves multiculturalism
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and its possibly radical implications for the nation-state
relationship. As scholars like Will Kymlicka have argued, such
steep departures will not be necessary as long as liberal theory
finds room for multi-national states. This is to say that the nation-
state conflation will have evaporated, but whatever nation-building
process occurs, it should always take place under the umbrella of a
single state government. As globalization continues its steady
march, the life and death of multiculturalism may end up turning
on the degree to which national identities are able to successfully
transcend state borders. What such a merging between the
multicultural and the cosmopolitan would mean for American
Indians in unclear, but it suggests a reversal of the social justice
argument. Whereas on the one hand the critique is that a
cosmopolitan identity espouses an abstraction satisfying only to
those that have considered themselves sufficiently disembedded,
the reversal is more akin to a transnational shift, which in many
ways is already happening. The benefit to American tribal powers
would not come as much from cross-border linking as it would
from a disaggregation of state authorities over distinct
nationalities.
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